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TOWARD AN ECONOMIC UNDERSTANDING OF
TOUCH AND CONCERNt
JEFFREY E. STAKE*
0, what men dare do! What men may do!
'What men daily do, not knowing what they do!'
INTRODUCTION
X promises A that Homeacre will be used for residential purposes
only. X sells Homeacre to Y Does X's promise bind Y?2 X promises A
to operate a first-class department store on Macyacre. After X sells Ma-
cyacre to Y, must Y also operate a first-class department store?3 X
promises A to pay for Greenacre. IfX sells Greenacre to Y before paying
A, does the debt pass to Y?4 X promises A to pay homeowners' dues and
assessments for Condoacre. X sells Condoacre to Y Can A extract the
homeowners' dues from Y?5 X promises A to bury a pipeline below the
surface of Oilacre. X sells Oilacre to Y, and A sells to B. Can B force Y
to bury the pipeline?6 X buys Damacre from A, promising to provide
electricity to A's new place of business. X sells to Y Must Y provide
electricity to A ?7
Notwithstanding the AIDS epidemic and the zero population
growth movement, the population of the United States is continuing to
increase, and land use is intensifying, at least by the simple criterion of
t This Article applies established economic concepts to a narrow corner of the law that has
caused substantial confusion and resisted coherent explanation. Cf C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS
AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 208 (2d ed. 1947) (Judge Clark uses the
phrase "so narrow a corner of the law"). I thank Henry Manne for some of the basic economic
training reflected in this paper. I also thank Judge Richard Posner, and Professors Richard Epstein,
Susan French, Jim Leitzel, Lora Holcombe, Harry Pratter, Val Nolan, Bill Hicks, Richard Fraher,
Joe Hoffmann, Ann Gellis, Craig Bradley, Merritt Fox, Stephen Conrad, Dan Conkle, and Don
Gjerdingen for helpful comments. Elizabeth Cure and Scott Schroeder provided research assistance.
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1975, Univer-
sity of Illinois; J.D., 1981, Georgetown University Law Center.
I. W. SHAKESPEARE, MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING act IV, sc. i, 1l. 18-19 (A. Humphreys ed.
1981).
2. See Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
3. See Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 759, 762-63 (E.D.
Va. 1982).
4. See Lisenby v. Newton, 120 Cal. 571, 573, 52 P. 813, 814 (1898).
5. See Boyle v. Lake Forest Property Owners Ass'n, 538 F. Supp. 765, 770 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
6. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1967).
7. See Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 308, 312-13, 181 S.E. 66, 68 (1935).
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people per acre. Even in the absence of population growth, land use in-
tensifies as the mechanization of farms and robotization of factories free
workers for employment or recreation elsewhere. The elsewheres are be-
coming more and more crowded and will probably continue to do so.
With this intensification, as Professor Richard Epstein has pointed out,8
covenants allowing two persons to share in the use of one parcel of land,
along with the law governing those covenants, gain importance.
The American Law Institute has commissioned Professor Susan
French, as Reporter, and an Advisory Board, to research and restate the
rules governing "servitudes," or promises connected to land. For the Re-
statement (Third) of Property, Professor French proposes to reweave the
ancient strands of servitude law into a new, and presumably smoother,
fabric.9 One of the knotty strands destined for elimination or replace-
ment is the "touch and concern" requirement:
The American Law Institute's new servitudes restatement project
is designed to shake servitudes law free from the old controls and
forms ....
The touch and concern doctrine provides a prime example: it
identifies neither the problems addressed nor the value choices that
must be made in determining whether to apply it.10
Some may mourn the passing of horizontal and vertical privity, and
touch and concern, but they may console themselves that, like the
Rule in Shelley's Case, the echoes will linger for a long time to come.I1
Professor French thus calls into question the function and utility of the
touch and concern requirement. This Article presents arguments for the
retention of that long-enduring strand.
The answer to each of the hypothetical questions above depends on
whether the promise at issue runs with an interest in land.1 2 Some
8. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906, 907 (1988) [hereinafter
Covenants and Constitutions] (expanded version of remarks delivered to Property Section of Ameri-
can Association of Law Schools, Miami, Fla., Jan. 8, 1987).
9. See French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Reweaving].
10. French, Servitude Reform and the New Restatement of the Law of Property. Creation Doc-
trines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928, 930-31 (1988) [hereinafter Reform]
(footnote omitted).
11. Reweaving, supra note 9, at 1319.
12. A successor to an interest in land might enforce a promise, or might have a promise en-
forced against her, in a court sitting either in law or in equity. When a promise is enforced by or
against a successor in a court of law, the promise is called a covenant running with the land. Some
covenants, called equitable servitudes, are enforced in equity even though they do not qualify as
running covenants. Because of the confusion generated by the differences between these similar
doctrines, scholars have urged that the two doctrines be merged into one. See Reichman, Toward a
Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1182, 1230, 1260 (1982); Reweaving, supra
note 9, at 1304, 1319. For purposes of this Article, the differences between the two doctrines are
unimportant because the touch and concern test has the same meaning in both contexts. See id. at
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promises run with interests in land and bind or benefit future owners;
others do not. When a promise runs with an interest in land, any person
acquiring the interest will succeed to the benefit or burden of the prom-
ise. The original parties to the covenant have attached the promise to the
land interest in such a way that no one person's action can separate it.
To make a promise run,13 the promisor and promisee14 must intend
that the promise be enforceable by and against their successors, as well as
between themselves. Mutual intent, however, is not enough. 15 Accord-
ing to traditional doctrine, courts will ignore the parties' intent and will
not attach a covenant to land unless the covenant has a special character,
a special relationship to the land.16 The "touch and concern" require-
ment identifies this special relationship, separating those promises capa-
ble of running from those that cannot.' 7 A covenant will bind or benefit
successors to an interest in land only if it touches and concerns. More-
over, the doctrine specifies that the two ends of the covenant'8 (i.e., its
benefit and its burden or its rights and its duties) require separate analy-
sis. 19 The benefit of a promise will not run with an interest in land unless
that benefit touches and concerns the land;20 likewise, the burden of a
promise will not run unless the burden touches and concerns.2' Any
1272 n.55. In law and in equity, if a promise runs, it modifies an interest in land in such a way that
acquisition of the interest in land carries with it the benefit or burden of the promise.
13. For the sake of brevity, and admittedly with a loss in precision, "run with an interest in
land" shall in some cases be shortened to "run with the land" or simply "run."
14. In this Article, promisors will usually be assumed to be male; promisees, female.
15. See, eg., 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.10, at 366 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 3 H. TIF-
FANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 854, at 461 (B. Jones 3d ed. 1939).
16. In some situations, a person asserting that a covenant runs must, in addition to showing the
special character of the covenant, satisfy other requirements having to do with the relationships
between the parties and their predecessors (such as horizontal and vertical privity), and must prove
notice. See, e.g., C. CLARK, supra note t, at 92-94; Stoebuck, Running Covenants: An Analytical
Primer, 52 WASH. L. REv. 861, 867 (1977). Because "it is the 'touch or concern' requirement
(usually rendered 'touch and concern' today) that gets to the heart of real covenants," Stoebuck,
supra, at 866, this Article leaves analysis of those other elements for another day and another author.
17. The touch and concern requirement applies both to equitable servitudes and to covenants
running with the land. See Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 892 ("To run, equitable restrictions must
touch and concern benefited and burdened land, and the requirement should be exactly the same as
for real covenants."). But see Oliver v. Hewitt, 191 Va. 163, 167, 60 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1950) (enforcing
covenant not to compete in equity after holding it unenforceable at law because it did not touch and
concern).
18. As used herein, "covenant" and "promise" mean the same thing.
19. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 15, § 9.13, at 374; R. BOYER, SURVEY OF
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 516 (3d ed. 1981); A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROP-
ERTY 990 (3d ed. 1984); C. CLARK, supra note , at 111.
20. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 869.
21. Id. This paper does not explore some of the deviations from this basic theme, such as the
rule that the burden will not run unless the benefit touches and concerns some land (i.e., when the
benefit is "in gross," see RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537(a) (1944)). This paper also does not
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combination is possible; either end, neither end, or both ends of a cove-
nant might touch and concern, and therefore be able to run with, an
interest in land.22
When does an obligation or a benefit touch and concern land? De-
fining the touch and concern element has indeed proved difficult.23 Pos-
sibly recognizing that no formulation better describes the test than the
words "touch and concern" themselves, the American Law of Property
does not even attempt to define the phrase explicitly.24 But the words
"touch and concern" offer inadequate guidance to conveyancers and
judges.25 As Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals stated in
one of the more famous touch and concern cases, Neponsit Property Own-
ers' Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank:26
In truth the test so formulated is too vague to be of much assistance
and judges and academic scholars alike have struggled, not with entire
success, to formulate a test at once more satisfactory and more accu-
rate. "It has been found impossible to state any absolute tests to deter-
mine what covenants touch and concern land and what do not. The
question is one for the court to determine in the exercise of its best
judgment upon the facts of each case." 27
Others have voiced similar opinions. 28 The Neponsit court itself adopted
address the distinction between touching and concerning a piece of land and touching and concern-
ing an estate in land.
22. See Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond, 109 Ill. App. 3d 689, 694-95, 440 N.E.2d 1264,
1268 (1982) (dicta) (burden side of covenant may run though benefit side in gross and cannot run),
aff'd, 99 I11. 2d 182, 457 N.E.2d 1226 (1983); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 481 (student ed. 1984).
23. Professors Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman describe the touch and concern concept
as "intangible." R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 22, at 475. That
term implies that it is easy to become concerned about touch and concern, but it is impossible to
touch it.
24. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 15, § 9.13, at 373-82.
25. For example, it would be difficult to predict from the words "touch and concern" that a
promise to pay money to a homeowners' association for maintenance of a swimming pool can run
with land but a promise to repay funds borrowed to build a swimming pool cannot. Cf Pelser v.
Gingold, 214 Minn. 281, 287, 8 N.W.2d 36, 40 (1943) (burden of covenant to pay promisee's per-
sonal debts incurred for improvements to land does not run because it does not touch and concern).
Nor does it seem obvious that a promise to carry passengers over one's rail system does not "touch
and concern" the land granted to the railroad. See Dickey v. Kansas City & I.R.T. Ry., 122 Mo.
223, 231, 26 S.W. 685, 687 (1894) (holding, as one alternative, that burden does not run to successor
railroad because covenant is in no way connected to land); Eddy v. Hinnant, 82 Tex. 354, 356-57, 18
S.W. 562, 563 (1891) (breach of covenant to furnish pass does not give rise to action for damages
against successor railroad, but only against promisor railroad; no mention of running covenant the-
ory or touch and concern element in opinion).
26. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
27. Id. at 256, 15 N.E.2d at 795 (quoting C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND INTERESTS
WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 76 (1st ed. 1929)).
28. R. BOYER, supra note 19, at 520 ("Neither the cases nor the commentators present an exact
test for determining whether or not a particular covenant touches or concerns land."); J. CRiBBET,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 193 (2d ed. 1975) ("The broad idea is clear enough, even
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a definition first suggested by Dean Harry Bigelow and later refined by
Judge Charles E. Clark:
If the promisor's legal relations in respect to the land in question are
lessened-his legal interest as owner rendered less valuable by the
promise-the burden of the covenant touches or concerns that land; if
the promisee's legal relations in respect to that land are increased-his
legal interest as owner rendered more valuable by the promise--the
benefit of the covenant touches or concerns that land.29
This formulation, however, runs in a circle.30 Of course the promisor's
legal relations are lessened if a court finds that the promise sticks to the
land, burdening all who come to own the land. As one might expect,
courts finding that a covenant touches and concerns have often invoked
this version of the test.31 Because other formulations do little more
to clarify the requirement, 32 the Bigelow-Clark version remains
though application to specific cases gets a bit sticky."); C. DONAHUE, T. KAUPER & P. MARTIN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITU-
TION 1157 (2d ed. 1983) ("[S]cholars and courts have repeatedly sought, without noteworthy suc-
cess, to elucidate the test."); S. KURTz & H. HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN
PROPERTY LAW 674 (1987) ("The concept of 'touch and concern' is extremely spongy, especially in
the middle."); Rose, Servitudes, Security and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and
Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1403, 1409 (1982) ("In the older interpretations of servitudes, the
fabulously frustrating doctrine of 'touch and concern' occupied a central place .... A reformed
servitude law, then, might well substitute a phrase such as 'land-development-related' for 'touch and
concern,' if only to shed the baggage of those old touch and concern doctrines, with all their vague-
ness and circularity."); Krier, Book Review, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1664, 1678 (1974) ("Odd as it may
seem, considerable effort has been devoted to divining the meaning of this requirement, but with very
little evidence of success.") (reviewing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972)).
29. C. CLARK, supra note t, at 97.
30. See Abbott v. Bob's U-Drive, 222 Or. 147, 159, 352 P.2d 598, 603-04 (1960); J.
DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 1037 n.56 (1981); R. ELLICKSON & A. TARLOCK, LAND USE
CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 620 (1981); Berger, A Policy Analysis of Promises Respecting
the Use of Land, 55 MIN. L. REv. 167, 210 (1970); Krier, supra note 28, at 1678. The way out of
the circle is to emphasize the words "in respect to the land" and "as owner" in the Bigelow-Clark
definition. Even this reading of the definition offers little aid, however. Discerning when legal rela-
tions are "in respect to land" is no easier than discerning when a promise touches and concerns land.
Berger, supra, at 211.
The Neponsit court asserted that the Bigelow-Clark "method of approach has the merit of real-
ism." 278 N.Y. at 257, 15 N.E.2d at 796. But even that court admitted that the adoption of the test
does not avoid a "question of degree." Id., 15 N.E.2d at 796. Professor Goldstein notes that "New
York's decisions on the touch or concern requirement have been sparse, inconsistent, and unenlight-
ening." P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY 761 (1984). That the New York decisions are often hailed
as leading cases makes this observation all the more discomforting.
31. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 953 (5th Cir. 1967) (burden made interest in
land less valuable and benefit made interest in land more valuable, so benefit and burden touch and
concern and run); cf City of Reno v. Matley, 79 Nev. 49, 56-57, 378 P.2d 256, 260 (1963) (benefit of
covenant to construct and maintain street meets Clark's test and runs).
32. Professor Cribbet suggests the following in his fine textbook:
If the promises are those you would normally expect to find in a lease and if they relate to
the subject matter of the lease ... they undoubtedly "touch and concern" the land. If they
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authoritative. 33
This Article suggests an alternative understanding of the touch and
concern element, one framed in terms of efficiency. 34 More precisely, my
hypothesis is that courts find that a covenant touches and concerns land
when the benefit or the burden at issue is more efficiently allocated to the
successors than to the original parties to the covenant.
One should not read this efficiency-oriented view of touch and con-
cern to imply that courts now justify or have in the past justified the
touch and concern requirement with economic arguments. Indeed, the
origin of the phrase "touch or concern" traces back to 1583,35 when little
policy explanation was expected in judicial opinions and long before eco-
nomic analysis gained currency. The attempt here is not to explain what
are abnormal and seem to relate to the personal relationship of the parties rather than the
lease relationship.., they are collateral.
J. CRIBBET, supra note 28, at 193. Professor Tiffany states:
a covenant is regarded as touching and concerning the land if it is of value to the cove-
nantee by reason of his occupation of the land or by reason of an easement which he has in
the land, or if it is a burden on the covenantor by reason of his occupation of the land.
3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 15, at 455. For other formulations, see Berger, supra note 30, at 210-11.
33. Other courts have adopted the Bigelow-Clark formulation since Neponsit. See, eg., Mobil
Oil, 385 F.2d at 953; City of Reno, 79 Nev. at 56-57, 378 P.2d at 260. Commentators also view that
definition as the most successful. See, eg., R. BOYER, supra note 19, at 516 (slightly rephrasing
test); A. CASNER & W. LEACH, supra note 19, at 990 (referring to Bigelow); J. CRIBBET, supra note
28, at 192 (same); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHIrMAN, supra note 22, at 474-75
(referring to Bigelow-Clark); see also 5 FR POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1675 (P. Rohan
rev. ed. 1988); Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with the Land at Law,
27 TEx. L. REv. 419, 429-30 (1949).
Clark offered a less "scientific" test only two pages later in his little book on covenants. He
said, "Where the parties, as laymen and not as lawyers, would naturally regard the covenant as
intimately bound up with the land, aiding the promisee as landowner or hampering the promisor in
similar capacity, the requirement should be held fulfilled." C. CLARK, supra note t, at 99. Clark
must have meant that courts should apply this test by referring to expectations other than those of
the two original parties to the covenant, since the intent element already addresses their expecta-
tions. But what the public regards as intimately bound up with land depends in part on what
promises the law allows to be tied to land. For the test to avoid this circularity, one must presume
that the word "naturally" separates out the effect on a person's expectations wrought by the law
itself. Even if that is possible, a test grounded in the natural expectations of a layperson calls for the
kind of sociological data courts are poorly suited to gather and, in reality, leaves tremendous discre-
tion to the judge. In either case, the test affords little predictability and security to lawyers planning
conveyances.
34. This Article adopts a Posnerian meaning of efficiency. In the spirit of Kaldor-Hicks, Judge
Posner asks who would end up with an asset (or liability) if voluntary transactions among all persons
involved were feasible. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (3d ed. 1986); see also
Culp, Judex Economicus, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1987, at 95, 101-05 (discussing Pose
nerian judge's approach). A covenant case presents the court with the question whether X or Y
must bear the burden of performing a covenant. If (1) X and Y are the only affected persons, (2)
objective reasons support the belief that X and Y would agree between themselves to allocate the
burden to X, and (3) substantial transaction costs would prevent such a private allocation, then the
court should allocate the burden to X.
35. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
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courts have said, but rather what they have done. The data most rele-
vant to this inquiry are the facts and the results of cases in which courts
have indicated that the result turned upon the application of the touch
and concern test.
Any attempt to use an efficiency test confronts an immediate hurdle.
Efficiency concerns often support the conclusion that courts should en-
force the parties' freely negotiated agreement in accordance with their
intent. However, by limiting the types of promises that two parties may
attach to land, the touch and concern requirement interferes with the
intentions of the original parties to the promise. Professor Epstein argues
that this interference is unwarranted.36 He attacks judicial use of touch
and concern to overcome the original parties' intentions. While Epstein
acknowledges that third parties need some protection from invisible obli-
gations secretly attached to land, he concludes that the constructive no-
tice provided by modern recording acts adequately protects strangers
from such surprise obligations. 37 The restrictions that the touch and
concern requirement imposes on freedom of contract impair efficiency by
creating uncertainty about the doctrine's application and incentives for
economically less desirable transactions. 38 Therefore, Epstein argues, the
mutual intent of the parties should determine whether promises attach to
land. 39
36. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1353
(1982) [hereinafter Freedom of Contract]. Epstein presumably would not object to the use of touch
and concern as a means of determining the parties' intent when that intent is otherwise unclear.
37. Record notice protects individual strangers from unwittingly failing to deal with all of the
necessary parties in acquiring a desired interest in land. Id. at 1357.
38. Id at 1361-64.
39. Epstein's attack on the touch and concern element sounds in libertarianism as well as utili-
tarianism. Professor Allison Dunham, on the other hand, suggests that liberty is compromised by
unrestricted freedom to bind covenants to land. See Dunham, Promises Respecting the Use of Land,
8 J.L. & ECON. 133, 164-65 (1965). This Article takes no stand on how best to protect or foster
liberty; efficiency is the only criterion explored. A comment on the coercive effects of the touch and
concern element and the land promise doctrine may, however, be appropriate here. The land prom-
ise doctrine allows judicial enforcement of promises against persons who have not explicitly agreed
to be bound by those promises. The touch and concern element, by limiting such occasions, reduces
the frequency of such coercive state actions. But the touch and concern requirement allows enforce-
ment of obligations against the original promisor for a time period longer than he bargained for. The
occasions of such extended enforcement against the original promisor will, by logic, outnumber the
situations in which the requirement prevents the state's coercion against the successor. By substitut-
ing some cases of coercion against the original promisor for a smaller number of cases involving
coercion against successor promisors, touch and concern increases the frequency of coercive state
action against persons who have not agreed to be bound. But the frequency of coercive state actions
should not be the sole consideration in the coercion calculus. Coercion against successors may be
more obnoxious than coercion against the original promisor. The original promisor knowingly
agreed to perform for a while; the successor has not agreed to perform at all. It might be less
offensive to force two persons to continue to perform beyond the agreed time of performance than to
force one person to perform a promise that he has never considered making. The touch and concern
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Epstein's argument might convey the impression that the property
law governing the scope of promises that attach to land is more restric-
tive than contract law, that agreements otherwise enforceable as con-
tracts become unenforceable because they relate to land. But such an
impression is unwarranted. No one contractually bound to perform an
obligation can be freed from performing merely because the obligation is
connected to an interest in land. If, in the silent presence of Y, X
promises A that anyone buying his car will allow A to drive it occasion-
ally and Y later buys the car from X, courts will not hold Y bound to X's
promise. To the limited extent that property law allows the enforceabil-
ity of promises against persons who have not voiced assent, it enlarges
the scope of enforceable promises beyond that of ordinary contract
rules.4o
On the other hand, the touch and concern requirement prevents in-
tended beneficiaries from enforcing some promises designed to benefit
third parties. On the benefit end of covenants, then, property law doc-
trines do appear to restrict freedom of contract. This theoretical restric-
tion has little restrictive effect, though, because a promisee can assign any
benefits that do not touch and concern to her successor as ordinary con-
tractual rights.41 Because a party can easily circumvent the touch and
concern requirement on the benefit side of the covenant, the important
question is whether the requirement serves as a useful limitation on the
parties' ability to create burdens that will bind nonparties.
Part I of this Article justifies a heightened judicial scrutiny of at-
tempts to attach promises to land (as opposed to ordinary contracts) and
offers some utilitarian reasons for questioning Epstein's normative con-
clusion that, as far as efficiency is concerned, a court's consideration of
intent and notice should suffice.42 The first part reaches no conclusion
element also tells some people desiring to make a deal that the government will not enforce the deal
as they structure it. But a governmental refusal to enforce an agreement ought not to be considered
as coercive as a governmental enforcement of an agreement against a person who has not agreed to
be bound.
40, Two special aspects of covenants relating to land allow this extension beyond the ordinary
bounds of contract law. First, the recording system makes it relatively easy to devise a system for
giving purchasers notice that a liability is attached to the asset. Second, the asset itself is not mova-
ble, so it may serve as security for the performance of the promise.
41. City of Reno v. Matley, 79 Nev. 49, 56, 378 P.2d 256, 260 (1963). A successor would lose
(or fail to acquire) the benefit of a promise that was intended to run in a case where a court deter-
mined that the benefit did not touch and concern, that the promisee had not specifically assigned the
benefit, and that the promisee was unavailable. But such a case should not occur often. The prom-
isee has an incentive to inform the successor of the benefit's existence, and, once informed, the suc-
cessor can easily protect his interest by getting an express assignment of the benefit.
42. Professor Sterk launches a multi-pronged attack on Epstein's analysis. See Sterk, Freedom
from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. Rv. 615
(1985). Sterk argues that servitudes may generate negative effects that are external to the parcels
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regarding whether the benefits of this judicial interventton outweigh the
transaction costs and disincentives that arise from such review. This
part's only objective is to show that courts might achieve some gains in
efficiency by closely reviewing attempts to attach covenants to land. Af-
ter exploring reasons why courts may rightly hesitate to honor the origi-
nal parties' intent to bind a promise to land, part II discusses the role of
the touch and concern requirement in land promise doctrine. Part III
then analyzes the results of cases in which the courts have applied the
touch and concern requirement and identifies the fact patterns that over-
come judicial reluctance to allow covenants to attach to interests in land.
This descriptive part concludes that touch and concern functions in a
way easily understood in efficiency terms. The Article thus demonstrates
that economic benefits support and explain the hearty survival of "touch
and concern."'43
The approach taken in this Article differs from the mode of eco-
nomic analysis frequently used to examine legal issues-examination of
the incentives created by various proposed rules. The incentive effects
are an essential component, but only one component, of the economic
picture of servitude law. Just as deterrence cannot guide the entire dis-
cussion of criminal law issues such as the death penalty, incentives can-
not guide the entire discussion of touch and concern. Just as the rate and
severity of accidents make up only one part of the economic analysis of
accident liability rules,44 disincentives and uncertainties stemming from
involved in the servitudes and unaccounted for in negotiating the servitudes. Id. at 621-24. He also
argues that landowners can make mistakes regarding their own best interests and that a paternalistic
concern for landowners' well-being may justify judicial supervision of servitudes. Id. at 617. More-
over, Sterk asserts, perpetual enforcement of servitudes resolves difficult questions of intergenera-
tional fairness against future generations. Id. at 616-17, 634-39, 643-44. This Article takes a
narrower view that ignores most effects external to the specified parcels of land under a covenant and
avoids any reliance on a paternalistic concern for the well-being of covenant-making landowners.
This Article's efficiency approach to intergenerational concerns also differs from Sterk's fairness
approach.
43. This survival alone suggests that the touch and concern element helps to achieve an efficient
allocation of resources. "One of the things that positive economic analysis of law has taught us is
that we should think long and hard before condemning to oblivion institutions that have survived for
many centuries." Symposium: Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law-Round Table Discus-
sion, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 793, 854 (1986) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (comments of T. Mer-
rill). Apart from covenants between landlords and tenants, this position has less force because, as
Professor Reichman notes, the running covenant doctrine has existed for less than 200 years.
Reichman, supra note 12, at 1212.
44. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACcIDENTs 26-28 (1970). The approach here corre-
sponds to the part of Calabresi's analysis that relates to the distributional effects of various liability
rules. Calabresi divides the economic concerns into primary, secondary, and tertiary costs of acci-
dents. In his analysis, the primary costs include the effects of a liability rule on the rate and severity
of accidents; secondary costs are the societal expenses that result from accidents; and tertiary costs
are the sums society must spend for administering a liability rule. The incentive effects discussed by
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the very existence of touch and concern make up only one part of the
analysis of the requirement. Leaving aside incentive effects on other par-
ties, the operation of the doctrine has efficiency ramifications in each con-
crete case. Even focusing solely on efficiency, what happens to particular
covenantors and their successors matters too.
I. THE COMPLEXITY OF TYING PROMISES TO LAND
Epstein's position takes insufficient account of the fact that people
do stupid things.45 When people act stupidly, they reduce the well-being
of society. One response to this point is that a person making an error
shoulders the entire loss, that the rest of society loses nothing. Although
an error-maker does himself bear the entire loss of wealth, most people
do not consume all their assets before dying. To the extent that an error
reduces wealth that the error-maker would have left to others, society
bears the loss. 46 The point here is not that the individuals lack sufficient
incentives to make correct decisions.47 As Judge Posner has explained,4s
anyone who dies holding substantial assets must have some desire to pass
those assets to his successors. If such a decedent valued consumption
over beneficence, he would have purchased an annuity allowing complete
consumption of his wealth without risk of exhausting it before his
death.49 Since the decedent had a beneficent intent, he would value a
Epstein correspond to Calabresi's primary costs; the efficiency concerns discussed here correlate to
Calabresi's secondary costs of accidents.
45. The point hardly needs support, but some credit for its application to land law should be
given to Victor Goldberg, who has offered the observation in response to Epstein's attacks on the
Rule Against Perpetuities. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 43, at 842 (comments of V.
Goldberg). The point applies equally well to covenants.
46. See Sterk, supra note 42, at 617 (to permit current landowners' preferences to govern for a
long time would be to resolve difficult questions of intergenerational fairness against future
generations).
Donative activities have the ability to multiply the happiness generated by wealth. If a donor
suffers a loss, she derives less happiness from giving because she has less to give. The donee also
receives fewer assets to enjoy.
Even if the diminution in wealth does not reduce the potential for consumption that the error-
maker will pass on to others, society may still bear some of the consequences of the error. For
humanitarian reasons, we do not usually allow fellow Americans to starve to death. If one dissipates
all of her own wealth and survives, society will share with her. In doing so, society takes upon itself
some of the losses caused by individuals' mistakes.
47. An argument along those lines could, however, be made. Professor Williams observes that
in some circumstances individuals will insufficiently account for the value of a resource to future
generations, resulting in a decision to consume rather than conserve. See Williams, Running Out:
The Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 199 (1978). If the attachment of
covenants constitutes consumption, judicial restraint might be justified to reduce consumption in
order to achieve greater long-term efficiency in the allocation of land resources.
48. R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 480.
49. The possibility of extreme sickness, curable only at a high cost, casts some doubt on this
conclusion. If there are expensive cures for ailments against which one cannot insure, it may be
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larger gift over a smaller gift and thus would have an incentive to maxi-
mize his wealth, including an incentive not to make a mistake in writing
a covenant. Regardless of incentives, however, the fact remains that in-
dividuals make mistakes.50 The point of this consumption argument is
merely that the rest of society has good reason to be concerned about
such errors, because society, along with the individual, bears a portion of
the loss. Above and beyond any paternalistic reasons for us to care about
an individual's mistakes,5' we have a self-interested reason to care-mis-
takes reduce the wealth of those surrounding the mistake-maker.52
A. The Difficulty of Correcting Errors.
One witless thing a person might do is attach a covenant that bur-
dens himself far more than it benefits the other party. This occurs when
the promisor mistakenly underestimates the extent to which attaching
the promise will diminish the value of his land and, as a result, sets his
price for the covenant too low. Because of this, the burdens generated by
the covenant can outweigh its benefits.
In a simple two-party situation, parties could negotiate for the ter-
mination of such a promise after discovering the error. Thus, if cove-
nants always benefited and burdened only two identifiable parties, a
special land covenant doctrine might not be needed.53 But land cove-
nants last longer than many contracts; without special doctrinal con-
straints, they could endure forever, and in the course of that forever, the
land underlying the promise might be divided many times. Land inter-
ests can be divided in three ways: a single interest can be held concur-
rently by several owners; a single parcel can be divided into temporal
necessary to conserve wealth rather than buy an annuity if one is to optimize consumption by pro-
longing life.
50. Any analysis resting on an assumption that substantial numbers of competent individuals
will continue to make large mistakes may well strike an economist as a bit strange. For reasons
given below, however, human error deserves more attention in the land promise domain than in
ordinary contractual situations.
On the other hand, lawyers might consider strange any effort aimed at explaining why land
promises might not follow predictive models premised on rational decisionmaking.
51. It is sensible to desire protection from self-made mistakes if a social rule can achieve that
protection more cheaply than any personal efforts to prevent mistakes. For example, the construc-
tive notice provided by the recording acts is not actual notice. This gives an error-maker an opportu-
nity to quietly shift the loss to another, getting from a purchaser the full fair market value of a piece
of land as if it were unencumbered by a promise. It is not obvious that the recording acts necessarily
provide enough protection from devious error-makers.
52. We collectively protect ourselves against the possibility that we will individually inherit
land assets that have been deprived of their value by being knotted to irrelevant promises.
53. This weak conclusion remains questionable, however, because even in simple two-party
situations negotiations can break down. See Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20-24
(1982) (strategic bargaining often leads to noncooperation).
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interests; and one plot can be divided into many. However the division
occurs, the attached promise will also be divided. Thus, land covenants
by nature divide more easily than ordinary contracts and have more time
to fall into multiple hands.54
Multiple ownership of a promise creates hurdles when a promisor
seeks to detach the promise from his land,55 with the result that the
promisor may not easily purchase his way free of the obligation when the
burdens outweigh the benefits. The simple problem of dealing separately
with a large number of parties could torpedo the promisor's attempt by
raising the costs of negotiation beyond the amount to be gained from
detaching the promise.5 6 Even if only a few parties need agree, holdout
problems may delay renegotiation or entirely prevent a promisor from
liberating his land from the covenant.5 7
A holdout problem develops when one party insists on more than a
proportionate share of the price that a willing buyer will pay for a right
held jointly by all members of a group, or when that party insists on
more than the value he places on the right simply because others are
receiving a higher amount. Suppose, for example, that five adjoining
landowners hold the benefit of a covenant that prevents use of certain
land for a business. If business use would increase the value of the servi-
ent parcel by $100,000, renegotiation should occur if the total reduction
in value to surrounding parcels is less than that amount. But if one
54. Many of the points in this subsection do not apply to promises to pay money. The ineffi-
ciencies associated with the attachment of such promises to interests in land are discussed separately.
See infra text accompanying note 136.
55. The promise can be detached by complete rescission or by permanent allocation to one
person.
56. See Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model
of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 723, 724-25 (1986).
57. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1106-08 (1972); Sterk, supra note 42, at 620. In addition to
the holdout problem, a free rider problem could possibly hamper efforts to terminate an inefficient
covenant. The free rider problem occurs when access to a benefit cannot be restricted to those
willing to pay for the benefit. Situations where free riders prevent termination of a running promise
appear to be rare. If the benefit of such a promise has been divided widely, the only obstacle to
negotiated termination is the holdout, because the benefits of the contemplated negotiation will ac-
crue to a single person, the promisor or his successor. If the burden has been divided widely, the free
rider problem can occur only if lifting the burden from one landowner also lifts the burden from
those who do not pay for its removal. Ordinarily, an agreement between the promisee and one of the
promisors would not operate to free other promisors from their burdens. Other promisors or their
successors might, however, use such an agreement as evidence in favor of terminating the covenant
under a theory of laches, estoppel, or changed conditions. See Petersen v. Beekmere, Inc., 117 N.J.
Super. 155, 171-72, 283 A.2d 911, 920-21 (Ch. Div. 1971) (court refused to enforce covenants requir-
ing individual lot owners to purchase stock in property owners' association and pay assessments
because general scheme had been destroyed by releases given to some lot owners). Such an applica-
tion of those doctrines, if successful, could create a free rider problem.
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neighbor assesses his loss at $40,000 and the others see a loss of $10,000
each, one of the other four might not agree to nullify the restriction un-
less she also received $40,000. She might rather lose $10,000 than be
treated, in her view, unfairly. Even if all attach the same $10,000 valua-
tion to their loss and none care about fairness, one might see an opportu-
nity to make a killing by asking for $50,000. The promisor might then
refuse the deal in spite of the gains forgone.58 In any event, the party
who deals last holds a monopoly. For that reason, each party will at-
tempt to delay agreement until all others have agreed. Given that incen-
tive for delay, expunging the promise could take a long time.
While spatial division of land can lead to holdouts, any form of con-
current ownership may generate a different form of opportunistic behav-
ior: free riding. Each owner may refuse to pay for lifting a restriction,
hoping that other owners will pay and that there will be no legal means
of excluding him from the benefits. 59 Temporal division of land also ex-
acerbates the multiple-party problems, and creates another of its own.
Future interest holders may be difficult to identify; if they are not yet
alive or ascertained, communication and agreement become especially
problematic.60
One might argue that any pricing mistake made by a promisor will
be recognized by his successor, causing the successor not to buy until the
covenant is eliminated. The covenantor would then, before the land
could be divided, be forced to undo the restriction while the transaction
costs of detachment were still relatively low. This argument, however,
ignores the possibility that the benefited lands may have fallen into multi-
ple or uncertain ownership before the promisor's successor purchased the
burdened parcel. There is no reason for purchasers of benefited lands to
urge renegotiation of a covenant before they purchase. In addition, gra-
tuitous transfers of land occur frequently. Donees will be reluctant to
complain that the restriction reduces the value of the gift beyond the
amount of benefit that it generates for the promisee.
58. Studies in experimental economics indicate that people will incur some loss in order to
punish others for unfair behavior. Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 736 (1986).
59. Temporal division, too, can cause a free rider problem. Holders of contingent future inter-
ests in burdened realty are not sure whether they will ever get possession and may find it difficult to
calculate the value of their interest, burdened or free of the restriction. To solve this problem, a
present interest holder could buy up a benefit, acquiring freedom for himself and an interest he could
sell to his successor. This tactic might, however, cause rent seeking. If, for example, an earlier
owner purchases from a promisee a right to prevent construction above twenty feet and retains that
right while the land and a ten story building pass to his successor, the two will have a substantial
prize to fight over. The expenditure of funds in that competition, whether in court or out, wastes
resources.
60. See Ellickson, supra note 56, at 725.
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Thus, when burdened lands have fallen into multiple ownership,
strategic individual behavior or the necessity of multiple transactions will
often prevent or delay voluntarily negotiated termination of a bad prom-
ise.61 As a result, the promise may greatly reduce the value of the lands
to society, and much of the resulting consumption loss may fall on per-
sons other than the one who made the mistake.
Epstein cautions that transaction costs cut both ways. 62 He points
out that if reviving a covenant requires coordinated action among many
landowners, then achieving the necessary unanimous consent will be
highly unlikely. In such cases, the gains of a running covenant will be
lost. Just as opportunistic behavior can prevent the detachment of an
inefficient covenant from an interest in land, so too can opportunistic
behavior prevent the reattachment of an efficient covenant if a court
wrongly (inefficiently) decides to unstick a covenant that earlier owners
had tied to the land.
Although both underenforcement of efficient relationships and over-
enforcement of inefficient relationships are possible, the consequences are
not equally severe. The strategic behavior problems associated with reat-
taching promises found not to touch and concern pale by comparison to
the problems of detaching those same covenants if the touch and concern
requirement is not satisfied. If a covenant does not touch and concern
land and hence is unrelated to land use, there is no reason to believe that
it is important to have all of the landowners in a given area agree to the
covenant, i.e., there is no need for coordinated action to resurrect a simi-
lar covenant. The diminished importance of unanimous agreement
reduces landowners' opportunities for strategic behavior. As a result, a
person who wants to reestablish a covenant that has been stricken be-
cause it does not touch and concern will not confront any important stra-
tegic behavior problems. 63 If, for example, the promisee only needs one
promisor, she can approach many; she does not need the agreement of a
particular neighbor because the promise will be unrelated to that neigh-
61. The first question, then, is whether courts have upset efficient allocations of promises by
applying the touch and concern requirement. Have courts failed to perceive efficiencies that the
parties might have seen and attempted to achieve when they tried to attach the promise? Have
courts, by allocating wrongly, effectively terminated any covenants that, because of the possibilities
of strategic behavior, would be difficult to create anew? Next, assuming that few situations have
been made less efficient, have any been made more efficient? Or, assuming some efficiency gains in
individual cases, do those gains outweigh the costs that Epstein says retaining the requirement en-
tails? Finally, do fairness losses outweigh any efficiency gains from the touch and concern rule?
This Article does not attempt to answer the last two questions.
62. Freedom of Contract, supra note 36, at 1361.
63. This point suggests one possible economic definition of touch and concern: a covenant
touches and concerns land when possibilities of strategic behavior would make reconstructing a
similar promise difficult.
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bor's land. 4 Even if the promisee desires to purchase such a promise
from a group of people, she can do so by making her offer to a larger
number, or any number, of that group. Because the promise is unrelated
to land, her dealings are not limited to promisors who have a relationship
to any particular piece of land, and, because there is no essential party,
she confronts no holdouts. Similarly, if the initiator desires to be on the
burdened end of a promise and wants to get a number of persons to buy
the benefits, there is no reason why he needs to have all of any particular
group of landowners agree to pay for his performance; he confronts no
free rider problems. When a promise does not touch and concern, it will
be less difficult for private parties to recreate an efficient promise. The
probability that strategic behavior will interfere with the termination of
inefficient promises tied to land is greater than the likelihood that strate-
gic behavior will prevent the recreation of judicially detached covenants.
In these special cases involving promises relating to land, the immediate
costs65 of judicial action in one direction are greater than the immediate
costs of judicial action in the other.
Take, for example, a promise by X to A that the owner of X's lot
will massage the feet of the owner of A's lot. After transfers, successors
Y and B might place quite different values on the benefits and burdens of
the promise. If so (and if the promise can be enforced by B against Y) a
bilateral monopoly exists, hindering the detachment of the promise. No
similar bilateral monopoly would prevent the creation of a new promise
if the original promise were held unenforceable between the successors.
B. The Likelihood of Errors.
We should be especially open to the idea that people act improvi-
dently in the land transaction arena, because an extremely high percent-
age of land transfers occurs between actors who are not experienced in
the business of transferring land. Many, if not most, people will buy and
sell real property at least once in their life, but most of them will do so
fewer than ten times.66 Because transactions are infrequent, errors have
64. While it is possible that the promisee would need the promise to attach to land in order to
have security for performance, it seems unlikely that only one piece of land would be of sufficient
value to provide that security.
65. "Immediate costs" as used here means only those costs incurred by the parties in the case; it
does not include any financial effects on unrelated persons who learn of the decision or the law.
66. The importance of this fact, as it pertains to covenants, would diminish under an Epsteinian
law because covenants could arise separately from a land transfer, which might increase the fre-
quency of their creation. Nevertheless, the average person would probably not engage in a sufficient
number of covenant transactions to be weeded out of the market. Even if landowners attached
promises to land more frequently, they would not sell their land more frequently. It is the sale or
attempted sale of burdened land that weeds the promisor from the market or teaches him the market
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little opportunity to teach or eliminate those who are likely to err.
Therefore, compared to most markets, the real estate market is loaded
with error-prone actors. As a consequence, accuracy in pricing decisions
will vary much more in the land market than in other markets where
players have stayed in the game over a long series of transactions. 67
The abilities of the players aside, there are other reasons for giving
real estate covenant transactions less judicial deference than transactions
involving other assets. Items exchanged in the land covenant market are
much less standardized than stock or commodities, for example. Plots of
land are not fungible, and covenants vary infinitely. In addition, there
are no published market prices that a seller can use as a basis for even a
rough comparison. For those reasons, sellers have difficulty assessing a
covenant's impact on the future market price of burdened land. Mis-
takes, even large ones, will occur frequently. The absence of a market for
similar covenants attached to similar land makes it difficult for a cove-
nantor to estimate the effect of a covenant on the preferences of others
who might be interested in his land.68
One might argue that the same lack of a market applies equally to
most contracts for goods and services. Although many such contracts
are unique, land promises differ in important ways. The purchaser of
goods or services often buys an asset that will have a relatively short life
and will not be resold, except possibly for scrap. The purchaser intends
response to his behavior in attaching the promise. Without an increase in sales of burdened lands,
the market will remain full of novices.
67. Although many land transferors enlist the aid of a lawyer, lawyers do not usually add much
to their clients' price-setting ability. A lawyer may have seen covenants before, but not the covenant
at issue attached to the land at issue. Even if the lawyer has seen the same covenant attached to a
similar parcel, he may not know of any related diminution in market value. The problem is not that
the parties to the transaction do not understand the legal consequences of the deal, but rather that
one party does not comprehend the deal's financial consequences for him. Of course, many cove-
nants are written by professionals who fully understand the value of the covenants' benefits and
burdens. If the touch and concern requirement impedes the drafting or enforcement of such cove-
nants, then one might desire that a separate rule apply to major land developments such as residen-
tial subdivisions. The infrequency of cases holding covenants exchanged in major land development
projects unenforceable suggests that the touch and concern requirement does not create substantial
uncertainty for such professional drafters. It is, however, entirely possible that these professionals
turn to less appropriate, but more certain, forms of control when the touch and concern test may
pose a problem. See Freedom of Contract, supra note 36, at 1363 (implicitly suggesting private
contract provisions as the proper form of control). Whether the touch and concern requirement
substantially impedes these professionals presents a difficult empirical question.
Brokers may be of help in determining a covenant's value. Often, however, the buyer is the
promisor and the broker works for the seller. In such situations, it would be against the broker's
personal interests and professional obligations to warn the buyer of the negative value of a covenant.
68. The lack of a market should ordinarily encourage more judicial deference to price determi-
nations made by the parties. But, as explained below, courts do not review the pricing of covenants.
Judicial review of a covenant is limited to questions within the court's competence-those questions
answerable with facts that appear to be readily available to the court.
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to consume the investment. The critical question for the consuming in-
vestor is "What rents will the asset generate?" rather than "What is the
resale or market value of the asset?" The opinion of the market should
exert more influence on a promisor's price for a land promise than on a
purchaser's price for unique services or goods that are intended to be
consumed. Therefore, parties attaching a promise to land have access to
less of the information important to their decision than parties to ordi-
nary contracts. This lack of information magnifies pricing errors.
Finally, although covenant mistakes are difficult for the parties to
repair, they are relatively easy for society to undo. The stroke of a judi-
cial pen can detach a covenant; many other assets are not as easily re-
stored. Because the reparation is (at least relatively) simply effected and
because the land will, by its misuse, give notice of the value tied up in the
promise, some person will see the opportunity to realize a financial gain
by eliminating the promise. If any legal arguments that support detach-
ment or destruction of land promises exist, someone will sue to detach
them.69 And, of course, someone else will attempt to keep the promise
attached. Such legal battles for the values locked into a promise, a form
of "rent seeking,"' 70 waste resources. Indeed, in some circumstances, rent
seekers may expend more total resources in an effort to win than the
winner will actually gain.71
Clear legal rules on the running of a promise curtail rent seeking,
because they allocate the prize to one party before the game begins. Bat-
tles will be less frequent and waste more limited if the law allows no
exceptions to a promise's enforceability (or unenforceability). Even an
ironclad rule upholding all covenants, however, will not eliminate rent-
seeking behavior. As long as the common law allows new exceptions to
be grafted onto old rules, lawyers will invent new arguments and doc-
69. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 43, at 843 (comments of V. Goldberg), 846-47 (com-
ments of N. Komesar).
70. A lottery, the proceeds of which are not spent for the benefit of the players, exemplifies the
rent-seeking concept. Two (or more) players each purchase tickets in an attempt to win a prize. The
more one invests, the greater the chances of winning. At some point, though, the cost of investing
another increment outweighs the expected return, or the increase in chances of winning multiplied
by the amount of the prize. At that point, the player should stop investing. From the viewpoint of
each player, his behavior is optimal. But from the perspective of the players as a group, they have
wasted resources. If they had agreed between themselves to purchase one ticket and divide the prize
(or allocate it by flipping a coin), they would have guaranteed their winning of the prize and wasted
no resources in the process. Thus, any expenditure beyond the price of one ticket would be wasted.
71. See G. Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING
SOcIETY 97, 102 tbl. 6.2 (S. Buchanan, R. Tollison, & G. Tullock eds. 1980). The amount each
party ought to spend depends on the expenditure's perceived effectiveness. It is even possible for
each party's expenditures to exceed the value of the prize. Note also that the first lawsuit over a
covenant attached to land does not prevent additional rent seeking in the future if the court upholds
the attachment.
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trines in favor of new exceptions. If the prize is large enough, i.e., if the
increase in land value expected to arise when a restriction is eliminated is
large enough, rent seeking will occur no matter how clear the law is.72
Like clear rules, doctrines that reduce the frequency with which stu-
pid promises attach to land also reduce the frequency of rent seeking, by
eliminating the prize.73 Therefore, with regard to the waste caused by
rent seeking, the question is whether a reduction in prizes (lost but re-
storable rents) outweighs any decrease in clarity from the different legal
rule.
Rent seeking may be a greater problem in the area of land promises
than in other contract areas. The original parties to a land promise may
have had a common understanding of the promise's meaning, but failed
to express it clearly, leaving room for their successors to disagree on the
promise's scope. Any extra range of disagreement creates extra room for
rent seeking. 74 Furthermore, because the two parties are unlikely to be
related by any personal dealings (at least one of the two is, by hypothesis,
a successor), the promisor may feel less bound by "honor' or conscience
to perform the covenant. In other words, rent seeking carries a lower
personal or psychic cost. On the other hand, the parties will often be
neighbors, a relationship with incentives that may replace the absent in-
centives from prior dealings.
In short, because of the market and the players, mistakes will likely
be frequent, large, and costly for the successors to undo outside of the
courtroom. In order to preserve society's assets in such cases, the law
might intervene to invalidate the promises, just as the civil commitment
law restrains the actions of those who might destroy their own
property.75
72. Assuming risk-neutrality, as long as the odds of success multiplied by the value of success
exceeds the costs of the battle, it makes financial sense to start the fight. Because the odds of success
in court can never be reduced to zero, it is always possible for the prize to become sufficiently large
to make litigation a good investment.
73, One might respond that, because those doctrines do not eliminate the prize until they are
applied in a lawsuit, the doctrines require rent seeking in order to do their work. This view is wrong.
If the doctrine is clear (however complex), the parties will be able to determine that a promise does
not stick without rent-seeking litigation. The often costly process of getting legal advice does not
qualify as rent seeking.
74. The promisee's understanding is critical, for she can inflate the prize by demanding the
most costly performance conceivable under the covenant.
75. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 43, at 845-46 (comments ofR. Ellickson). The operation
of the touch and concern requirement, however, differs in a critical way from a doctrine of tempo-
rary insanity with respect to silly covenants. The land promise doctrines do not usually invalidate a
bad promise immediately upon its creation; a transfer of ownership must occur before a party can
rely upon any of the running covenant or equitable servitude requirements (except intent and com-
pliance with the statute of frauds) in resisting enforcement of the promise. A doctrine of silly cove-
nants would go further, invalidating the promises ab initio. The possibilities of multiple transactions
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One aim of this Article, so far, has been to suggest that there are
good reasons to suppose that a rule allowing judges to scrutinize
promises that two parties have attempted to attach to interests in land
might avoid large losses. This is not to say that such a rule will achieve
those gains, or that the gains will offset the disadvantages of intervention;
these questions remain open. The following part attempts to identify
how the touch and concern requirement might accomplish such gains, by
examining the doctrinal role of the requirement. In other words, the
next part reviews the ramifications flowing from a judicial determination
that a covenant touches and concerns or fails to touch or concern.
II. THE ROLE OF THE TOUCH AND CONCERN REQUIREMENT
In light of the efficiency concerns that arise when parties attach
promises to land, one might ask whether courts have applied the touch
and concern requirement to eliminate either those promises that are inef-
ficient from the start or those that have become inefficient over time.
Professor Reichman argues for an initial validity approach when he sug-
gests that the requirement fixes the boundaries of servitudes, only al-
lowing those that offer some positive efficiency gains to survive. 76 But
the operation of the requirement does not support that approach. The
cases do not even suggest that failure to satisfy the touch and concern
prerequisite would make a promise, purportedly attached to land, unen-
forceable between the original parties. If judges can or do use a touch
and concern requirement to weed out promises that lack potential for
efficiency, why do courts not also use the requirement to prevent enforce-
ment of a promise between the original two parties? Because of the re-
quirement's limited scope of operation, it cannot effectively serve to
determine the initial validity of promises attached to interests in land.
Nor does the touch and concern requirement appear well-suited for
the task of terminating agreements that have become inefficient or that
are likely to become inefficient over time.77 The requirement prevents an
original promisee from enforcing a promise against a successor to the
promisor even if just a month has passed from the time the covenant was
made. At the other extreme, touch and concern has no effect if land has
not changed hands, no matter how ancient the covenant. Moreover, ser-
vitude law contains other, more precise rules aimed at terminating cove-
and strategic behavior that would justify judicial scrutiny of the promise become problematic only
after a transfer of the promise-bearing land. Therefore, it is appropriate that the doctrinal hurdle
presented by the touch and concern requirement not apply in a suit between the original parties to
the covenant before either has transferred the land.
76. Reichman, supra note 12, at 1232-33.
77. See Reweaving, supra note 9, at 1308-09.
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nants that have become inefficient over time, such as the "change of
neighborhood" (or "changed circumstances" or "changed conditions")
doctrine and statutes limiting the duration of covenants. 78
Recognizing that the touch and concern requirement is poorly
suited to determining either initial validity or later obsolescence, 79 Pro-
fessor French argues that the requirement should be dropped entirely. 80
She correctly suggests that courts should not use the touch and concern
test to invalidate promises that are contrary to public policy. For exam-
ple, Justice Holmes, writing for the court in Norcross v. James, 81 should
have declared the covenant not to compete in that case unenforceable as
contrary to public policy rather than using the touch and concern test to
reach a pre-Sherman Act antitrust result. But Professor French's con-
clusion that the touch and concern requirement should be eliminated de-
pends on the premise that the requirement's function is to filter out
covenants that should not be enforced ab initio or because circumstances
have changed. 82
Clearly, a mismatch between the accepted operation of the touch
and concern test and the twin functions of determining initial validity
and eventual obsolescence exists. But that mismatch suggests two alter-
nate possibilities. One could conclude, as Professor French does, that the
touch and concern element does its job poorly and ought to be replaced
by a combination of constraints better tailored to making ex ante and ex
post determinations of validity. Or one could conclude that such validity
determinations are not what the requirement is all about. The problem
with the latter choice has been that most judges and scholars have failed
78. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 564 (1944); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra
note 15, § 9.39, at 444-48; R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, supra note 22, at 482-
83; 5 R. POWELL, supra note 33, 679[2]; Reweaving supra note 9, at 1281 n.106, 1300-02; see also
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1951(2) (McKinney 1979) (statutory method for terminating cove-
nants that lack substantial benefit).
79. Reweaving, supra note 9, at 1308-09.
80. Id. at 1319; Reform, supra note 10, at 933. Professor French, the Reporter for the Restate-
ment (Third) of Property, suggests replacing the touch and concern requirement with a combination
of ex ante "initial validity" constraints and ex post "termination" limitations, id at [text accompa-
nying note 68], which, she implies, could perform the requirement's proper function. She, like Pro-
fessor Epstein, advocates eliminating touch and concern. Unlike Epstein, however, she would retain
other constraints on servitudes. Id.
81. 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 (1885), overruled, Whitinsville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass.
85, 97, 390 N.E.2d 243, 250 (1979).
82. Norcross suggests that determining initial validity is a function of the touch and concern
requirement. But the occasional use of touch and concern as a test for initial validity or obsolescence
does not compel the conclusion that the element serves only that purpose. Such a use of the require-
ment might be a misuse. Indeed, the operation of the requirement suggests that it must have some
other function.
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to offer a convincing alternative interpretation. 3 Such an interpretation
of touch and concern must focus on the critical fact that the requirement
is not triggered unless and until a purportedly encumbered interest in
land is transferred.84
This Article focuses on the transfer. My thesis is that, rather than
determining the efficiency of the covenant itself, the touch and concern
requirement allows courts to determine the efficient allocation of the ben-
efits and burdens of the land promise. Consider, for example, a promise
by landowner X to neighbor A that the owner of X's land will keep a
barn painted an attractive color. If X sells to Y, A sells to B, and Y fails
to perform, the court might try to redetermine5 whether the promise is
itself efficient, i.e., whether the benefits to B of performance outweigh the
costs to Y of performing. Using the touch and concern requirement,
however, the court asks a different question: whether the benefits to B
are greater than the benefits to A, and whether the costs of performance
by Y are less than the costs of performance by X. The touch and concern
element thus helps to find the most efficient allocation of the covenant
between the prior holder of an interest in land and his successor.
Some might argue that the question of who should benefit or suffer
under a promise is not any more a matter for judicial determination than
the issue of a promise's efficiency. In either case, one might say, courts
should enforce what the parties have decided. But a significant difference
separates a decision to review the efficiency of a promise from a decision
to examine the efficiency of its allocation. To determine the efficiency of
a promise itself, whether it should be terminated or not, is to engage in a
balancing of one party's costs against another party's benefits, a matter
appropriately left to the parties themselves. But the efficient allocation
question asks how to allocate the two ends of a promise. The deci-
sionmaker must determine who will enjoy the benefit more (the promisee
or her successor) and who will suffer less under the burden (the promisor
or his successor) after the interests in land are sold. Those two issues
involve comparisons of benefits against benefits (on one end) and costs
against costs (on the other). Courts can better address these issues by
focusing on objective factors.
83. See Reform, supra note 10, at 931 n.14 ("Why does it matter whether a covenant burden or
benefit touches and concerns the land? We are never told.").
84. Judge Posner suggests a reading of touch and concern that properly accounts for the opera-
tion of the requirement. He states that "having too many sticks in the bundle of rights that is
property increases the costs of transferring property." R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 61. This view
would also account for the fact that the requirement results in plucking a few sticks from the bundle
exactly at the time of transfer. Posner, however, seems unconvinced by his own explanation. See id.
at 62.
85. X and A made the determination initially.
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Though this Article assesses touch and concern on economic
grounds, a fairness point in favor of allocation over termination can be
made. Under the efficient allocation approach, a finding that a covenant
does not touch and concern works a smaller injustice to the promisee
than it would if failure to satisfy the touch and concern requirement
could kill a covenant. If that were the case, the promisee would lose the
entire benefit of her bargain. Under the efficient allocation approach, the
covenant is not dead, and the purchaser of the benefit of a promise does
not lose the entire benefit of her bargain if a court holds that the cove-
nant does not touch and concern. If a court holds that the benefit does
not run, it has determined that the covenant is personal to the promisee.
She still holds the benefit, and she may assign it. If a court holds that the
burden does not touch and concern, the promisee has lost her security for
performance, 86 but the original promisor remains bound.87 The prom-
isee, however, may not be able to acquire jurisdiction over the original
86. By holding that the burden does not run, the court changes the promisee from a secured
creditor into an unsecured creditor. The touch and concern requirement says, in effect, that land
will not be automatic security for certain types of promises. If in attaching a promise (such as a
promise to pay money) to land, the promisee intended merely to acquire security for the perform-
ance of the promise, the promisee might have achieved that same goal by obtaining a mortgage
interest in the land or attaching a lien to the land. To provide a means of security for promisees, the
law need not allow covenants that do not touch and concern land to run.
The availability of alternative forms of security, however, indicates that there is nothing per se
objectionable in the attachment of unrelated obligations to land. Why then should the law divert
parties from a covenant and toward a mortgage? Covenants, being less formal than mortgages or
liens, seem less official and binding. The word "covenant" itself strikes a layperson as less important
than "lien" or "mortgage." (Even if the word "lien" is used in a deed, a court may require the
promise to touch and concern before enforcing it. See Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant
Indus. Sav. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248, 259-60, 15 N.E.2d 793, 794, 797 (1938). Neponsit implies that only
separately recorded liens give sufficient notice to avoid the touch and concern requirement.) More-
over, neither the word "covenant" nor any other legalese is needed to create a covenant. See 3 H.
TIFFANY, supra note 15, § 848, at 443. "[A]ny words in a deed which shew an agreement to do a
thing, make a covenant." Williams v. Burrell, 135 Eng. Rep. 596, 607 (C.P. 1845) (quoting 3 J.
COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, tit. Covenant, § l(A)(2), at 263 (5th ed. 1822)).
As a result, a covenant is slightly less likely to provide actual notice to the successor, which increases
the chance of unfairness to purchasers. Indeed, some scholars have used this idea of notice to define
touch and concern. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 30, at 211 ("[T]he requirement does serve the useful
purpose of putting the normal expectations of society into effect .... If this is so, then the test of
touch and concern ought to be what the usual expectation of a well-informed layman would be
.... "); Krasnowiecki, Townhouses with Homes Associations: A New Perspective, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
711, 718 (1975) ("The covenant must relate to the land in such a way that the ordinary mortal would
expect that if he takes the land, the covenant will come with it.").
In addition, and for the same reasons, a covenant might be less likely to impress upon the
promisor the reduction in marketability that its attachment to land poses; this problem increases the
likelihood of inefficient attachment. Furthermore, a promisor subdividing a parcel subject to a lien
or mortgage might be more likely to satisfy those encumbrances before closing (because of their
more accurately perceived effects on value) than to burden all of the subdivided parcels with the
restriction. In that way, the lien and mortgage methods of securing performance reduce the likeli-
hood that a burden will become difficult to undo because of multiple-party problems.
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promisor, and the practical result of such a holding may be the same as
terminating the covenant. 88 The efficient allocation hypothesis suggests
that the courts ignore this important practical point in determining
whether a promise touches and concerns.
Admitting that the operation of the touch and concern requirement
may work an unfairness to promisees in some situations does not mean
that the rule causes a net loss in fairness. Any inequity to promisees
from a loss of security for performance must be weighed against the fair-
ness gains that result from reducing the frequency of binding people to
promises of which they are unaware. One might argue that because a
successor to a burdened interest has constructive notice of the burden,
allocating that burden to him involves no unfairness: he should have
checked the record and obtained legal advice on whether a covenant
would bind him. On the other hand, the promisee also has the notice
given by the common law that some promises do not run with land and
cannot be attached to land by the mere statement that they are intended
to run. By giving such notice, the law gives the promisee an opportunity
to protect herself against the possibility that the promisor or his succes-
sor will not perform. If the promisee feels the need to have some interest
in the land to secure the promise, she ought to obtain a lien, mortgage, or
some other independent interest in land. Both sides have notice and op-
portunity to protect themselves; indeed the promisee may well have the
better notice and the better opportunity to protect herself. The fairness
gains from not enforcing promises against those who have not agreed to
perform could easily exceed the fairness losses to promisees. In any
event, reallocation is less unfair to promisees than complete termination.
The points made so far are theoretical. First, a judicial check on
private parties' attempts to attach covenants to interests in land might
enhance efficiency more than a similar check on private attempts to cre-
ate covenants. Second, the situations in which the touch and concern
requirement has importance demonstrate that the requirement can effec-
tively serve as a means of choosing which of two parties should bear or
enjoy a promise. It makes theoretical sense, therefore, to suggest that
courts should find the touch and concern requirement satisfied by facts
indicating that placing the burden (or benefit) on the successor would
87. In this-view, the touch and concern test accomplishes, without the need for an additional
clause in the original transfer, exactly what Professor Krier suggests the parties could accomplish by
an express provision that the original promisor will be liable if his successor fails to perform. Krier,
supra note 28, at 1679 n.44. It is only the focus on the allocation between the original party and
successor rather than between the successors that differentiates the analysis in this Article from
Professor Krier's.
88. This is especially true when the original promisor dies. His estate might be held liable for a
while, but, after the estate is wound up, the promisee has no remedy.
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prevent an inefficient situation. The remainder of this Article tests this
efficient allocation approach. Conceptually, the touch and concern re-
quirement provides a tool for detaching a promise that should not be
bound to an interest in land; it remains to be seen when the courts have
used the requirement as such a tool.
III. TESTING THE EFFICIENCY HYPOTHESIS
The hypothesis that the touch and concern requirement serves to
efficiently allocate the benefit and burden of a covenant raises two empiri-
cal questions: First, does the touch and concern requirement indeed
serve to allocate rather than terminate a covenant? Second, can alloca-
tions made by courts be explained in efficiency terms?89
A. Allocation or Termination.
Does touch and concern analysis decide the existence of a covenant,
or merely its allocation? Two complications arise when one seeks to an-
swer this question. The first stems from the separate element of intent
and the second from the fact that only limited parties appear before a
court deciding touch and concern cases. A court finding that a covenant
does not touch and concern might also find that the original parties did
not intend the covenant to be enforceable with respect to their succes-
sors. In such a case, the court would hold that the covenant is not en-
forceable at all, but the reason should be the lack of intent rather than
the failure to touch and concern; if the parties did not intend the cove-
nant to survive transfer, the touch and concern test is irrelevant. On the
other hand, a court might find that a covenant touches and concerns the
land at issue, but hold that the original promisor remains liable for per-
forming the promise even if he has sold his interest in the land.90 This
result is explainable on the ground that the original parties intended two
separate promises: an ordinary contractual obligation that would survive
the sale and a covenant that would run with the land.91 Therefore, cases
89, The best test of the hypothesis, of course, would be to use it to make predictions before
courts decide touch and concern cases. Given how few relevant opinions are currently published
each year, however, it would take many years to develop an adequate database. This Article instead
examines decided cases.
90. City of Glendale v. Barclay, 94 Ariz. 358, 362, 385 P.2d 230, 232-33 (1963) (promise to pay
$1.50 per month per house less than 250 built and connected to a sewer line does. not run because
promisee relied on original promisor's standing and credit). This result could also be explained on
the ground that the aspect of the covenant involving a promise to pay money did not touch and
concern,
91. In leases, for example, unless the covenant specifies otherwise, courts treat the promisor as
if he made two promises, one an ordinary personal contract, the other a covenant intended to run
with the leasehold. Professor Lawrence Berger concludes that, even after the land has been trans-
ferred, promisors continue to be bound to affirmative, as opposed to restrictive, covenants that run.
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holding the original promisor liable to perform a promise that also runs
with an interest in land do not necessarily undermine the efficient alloca-
tion theory. Nevertheless, the cases outside of the landlord-tenant area
generally do hold that a promisor relieves himself of the burden of a
promise by transferring his interest in the land;92 those cases thus tend to
confirm the hypothesis.
In addition to these complications with the intent element, proce-
dural practicalities hide the implications of courts' decisions. Rarely do
both of the parties to one end of a covenant appear before a court. Once
a court finds that the covenant does not touch and concern, the dispute is
resolved; the party asserting the covenant may not enforce it against the
party resisting enforcement. There is usually no need for the court to say
whether the covenant could be enforced by or against someone else.
However, in a 1941 case, 165 Broadway Building, Inc. v. City Investing
Co., 93 the Second Circuit strongly suggested that the covenants in ques-
tion would survive, benefiting the original promisor, even if they did not
touch and concern. Indeed, the court stated that "the refunds are due
and the question is whether they are personal rights, as contended by [the
original owner],... or are benefits which run with the land, as claimed
by [the present owner]."'94 Dicta in a few other cases also support the
efficient allocation view that covenants survive a finding that they do not
touch and concern.95
Berger, supra note 30, at 210 n.101. But the leasehold example does not compel such a broad con-
clusion. The narrower view is, as stated above, that leases contain two promises.
92. See Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md. App. 199, 217-20, 516 A.2d 1028, 1037-39 (1986), cert. de-
nied, 308 Md. 382, 519 A.2d 1283 (1987); Goldberg v. Nicola, 319 Pa. 183, 185-91, 178 A. 809, 810-
13 (1935) (original promisor not liable on promise to abide by height restrictions); Oliver v. Hewitt,
191 Va. 163, 166, 60 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1950); accord Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servi-
tudes, 55 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1323, 1335 n.54 (1982). But some decisions do hold the original promisor
to his promise. Id. at 1336 n.56.
93. 120 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 314 U.S. 682 (1941).
94. Id at 814.
95. See Choisser v. Eyman, 22 Ariz. App. 587, 589-90, 529 P.2d 741, 743-44 (1974) (benefit of
refund covenant does not run; original promisor can enforce); Meado-Lawn Homes, Inc. v. West-
chester Lighting Co., 171 Misc. 669, 13 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (because promise to refund
money paid for gas mains construction does not run, original promisee can enforce; court finds-
neither touch and concern nor intent that covenant run), aff'd, 259 A.D. 810, 20 N.Y.S.2d 396,
aff'd, 284 N.Y. 667, 30 N.E.2d 608 (1940). The court in Dickey v. Kansas City & I.R.T. Ry., 122
Mo. 223, 230, 26 S.W. 685, 687 (1894), after holding against a promisee on the ground that the
covenant at issue did not touch and concern, opined that the promisee was entitled to specific per-
formance by the original promisor if performance was within the original promisor's power. The
opinion in Eddy v. Hinnant, 82 Tex. 354, 18 S.W. 562 (1891), supports the same conclusion but is
less conclusive because the court does not mention the running covenant theory or the touch and
concern requirement. The Eddy court held that breach of a covenant to furnish a pass does not give
rise to an action for damages against a successor railroad, only against the promisor railroad. Id. at
355, 18 S.W. at 563. Likewise, in Ruddick v. St. Louis, K. & N.W. Ry., 116 Mo. 25, 30, 22 S.W.
499, 500 (1893), the court stated that the promisee could bring an action for damages against the
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Because few, if any, cases have required a court to decide whether a
covenant that did not touch and concern (but was intended to survive)
would continue to bind or benefit the original party, the direct implica-
tions of that part of the hypothesis are relatively unimportant. Certainly,
cases holding that such a covenant did not survive would undermine the
efficient allocation hypothesis, but the mere absence of cases holding that
such covenants survive does not. The important empirical question is
whether the hypothesis explains the results in cases that turn on the oper-
ation of the touch and concern test. In the area of touch and concern,
"[t]he cases really should be examined in the library and in detail." 96
The next sections undertake such an examination to see whether an effi-
ciency analysis can explain the results in touch and concern cases. Sec-
tion B tackles the burdens, section C the benefits.
B. Allocation of Burdens to Promote Efficiency.
A court's theoretical choice on the burden side of a covenant is
whether the promise is enforceable against the original promisor or his
original promisor based on a covenant that did not touch and concern. The court in Oliver v.
Hewitt, 191 Va. 163, 167, 60 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1950), offered additional support for this position when it
wrote that a covenant not to compete is "binding between the original parties... [and] only the
original parties as it does not run with the land." See also Stegall v. Housing Auth., 278 N.C. 95,
100, 178 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1971) ("A restriction which is merely a personal covenant with the granter
does not run with the land and can be enforced by him only.").
The opinion in Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 135-36, 103 N.E. 1114, 1117 (1913), supports the
opposite conclusion-the failure to touch and concern terminates the covenant. See also Town of
North Hempstead v. Eckerman, 30 Misc. 2d 798, 802, 216 N.Y.S.2d 566, 570 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (cove-
nant to demolish building on land did not run), aff'd, 21 A.D. 751, 252 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1964). Finally,
one could argue that the absence of dictum in Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, 67 N.J. Super. 111,
170 A.2d 52 (App. Div. 1961), suggests that the New Jersey court thought the covenant would not
be enforceable against the original promisor after he sold the burdened interest.
Professor Lawrence Berger has stated that touch and concern determines whether a restrictive
covenant binds the person or the land, but excludes affirmative covenants from that assertion. Ber-
ger, supra note 30, at 210 n.101. Other scholars agree with Berger's conclusions. See S. KuRTZ &
H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, at 674 (physician (original promisor) continues, after land transfer,
to be liable on promise to perform checkups); see also J. CRIBBET, supra note 28, at 193 (covenant
"does not 'touch and concern' the estate and cannot be enforced by or against remote parties"); 3 H.
TIFFANY, supra note 15, § 854, at 455 ("[flf it is not so related it will not accompany a transfer of
ownership.").
It is primarily on this question of allocation versus termination that this Article differs from
Professor Krier's excellent analysis in his book review of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law. Krier,
supra note 28, at 1679.80. Professor French has taken the opposite view for the Restatement
(Third). Under her scheme, a set of initial validity and termination constraints can accomplish any
useful limitations that are effected by the touch and concern requirement; consequently, touch and
concern can be deleted from land promise doctrine. Reform, supra note 10, at [text accompanying
note 68]. Although such a change might indeed streamline servitude doctrine, this Article's position
is that no combination of validity and termination constraints can accomplish the results of a cor-
rectly applied touch and concern requirement.
96. C. CLARK, supra note , at 230.
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successor.97 This Article seeks to show that, given such a choice, courts
allocate responsibility to avoid results that would leave a large potential
for inefficiency. Courts try to avoid situations that would require addi-
tional transactions or allow strategic behavior. If a covenant is to run,
the nature of the covenant and the land to which it is supposedly at-
tached must give the courts some reason to presume that placing the
burden of the covenant on the successor to the interest in land would be
more efficient than allocating the burden to the original promisor.
Otherwise, courts will choose to detach the promise in order to avoid the
potential inefficiencies inherent in any running covenant. 98  A tie does
not go to the runner; if the facts do not justify a belief that allocating the
burden to the successor will avoid an identifiable inefficiency, the burden
will not run with the land.
To facilitate analysis, the following discussion separates land
promises into two basic categories: (1) promises that a landowner will
(or will not) do an act that must be done on either the promisor's or the
promisee's land, and (2) promises that a landowner will (or will not) do
something that can or must be done away from either the promisor's or
promisee's land.
1. Promises Performed on the Land.
a. Promisor's land. Covenants in which a landholder has prom-
ised that a certain act will not be done on his land make up one-half of
this group. One example is the commonplace covenant not to construct
any building within a certain distance of a street. On first impression, it
appears that the original promisor can perform such a covenant as easily
as his successor. Indeed, it is easier for former owners not to build than
for a current owner. Were that the whole matter, the efficiency hypothe-
sis would predict that a court would find such a covenant collateral and
hold that it does not run. But a covenant not to build near the street is
intended as more than a promise by the promising lot owner not to build
beyond a set-back line. A court would deem the promise broken if the
promisor's son built a club house too near the street or if a builder mis-
takenly constructed a garage too near the street. In either event, the
court would interpret the promise as a promise both not to build and not
97. See, ag., Dickey, 122 Mo. at 230, 26 S.W. at 687 (burden of covenant to supply railroad
pass does not run with railroad's land to successor railroad; promisee could win specific performance
against original promisee if original promisee still able to comply); Ruddick, 116 Mo. at 30, 22 S.W.
at 500 (promisee can bring action for damages against original covenantor, or can bring action in
ejectment for condition broken). But see Miller, 210 N.Y. at 135-36, 103 N.E. at 1117 (court sees
question as one of allocating expense between promisee and successor to promisor; court holds that
burdens of affirmative covenants do not run).
98. See supra notes 45-89 and accompanying text (identifying these inefficiencies).
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to allow anyone else to build in the specified area.99
If the covenant is read as a promise not to allow construction, the
landholder could perform the covenant more readily than could the orig-
inal promisor. The successor holds the legal right to prevent construc-
tion on the land and, as a practical matter, could easily prevent anyone
from building. The original promisor could enforce the covenant only by
negotiating with the would-be builder not to build or with the successor
to prevent the building. In either case, the parties would have to spend
some time negotiating the form of the agreement, the price to be paid by
the promisor,'0° and possibly the nature of the security provided by the
successor. Finally, all of these negotiations would have to be expressed
and memorialized. The result of placing the burden of the covenant on
the promisor rather than his successor is to add an extra and substantial
set of transaction costs to the promisee's performance. Because allocat-
ing the promise to the successor will prevent these costs, the efficiency
hypothesis predicts that covenants not to do something on or with the
promisor's land should run with the land, and indeed they usually do. 101
99. See Klapproth v. Grininger, 162 Minn. 488, 203 N.W. 418 (1925) (covenant restricting use
of lot to residential purposes is violated by granting perpetual easement across lot for right of way to
other landowners); see also 3 H. TIEFANY, supra note 15, § 862, at 491 n.84.
100. Substantial rent seeking may occur as the parties negotiate the price. The original promisor
will realize a gain if he can get his successor to perform for an amount less than the cost of buying
out the promisee and less than the cost of nonperformance. If those costs are both high, then a large
prize awaits the most effective bargainer. In such a case, both bargainers will waste substantial
resources in the bargaining process. Where there are multiple promisees, the cost of buying out the
promisees is likely to be especially high. The cost of not performing can also be high if the court
orders an injunction.
101. Covenants not to do an act on a promisor's property come in many forms, almost all of
which have been found to touch and concern the land. See, eg., Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So.
2d 302, 311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (covenant restricting land use to dwellings runs), cert. denied, 192
So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1966); Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987) (covenant disallowing commercial use of land runs); Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., 100
N.M. 389, 391, 671 P.2d 637, 639 (1983) (deed restriction preventing construction within 50 feet of
street runs with restricted land); Eppolito v. Medlicott, 28 Misc. 2d 43, 46, 211 N.Y.S.2d 302, 306
(1961) (covenant forbidding nonresidential land use runs); Latimer v. Pierce, No. 126, slip op.
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn file); Collum v. Neuhoff, 507 S.W.2d
920, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (covenant not to erect house or fence within 25 feet of "parkline"
touches and concerns land); see also Cook v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 560 F.2d 978, 987 (10th Cir.
1977) (covenant not to dig wells that would result in waste of potash runs); Chi-Mil Corp. v. W.T.
Grant Co., 70 F.R.D. 352, 357 (burden of covenant not to make structural changes to building runs),
amended on other grounds, 422 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Wis. 1976); In re 523 East Fifth Street Housing
Preserv. Dev. Fund Corp., 79 Bankr. 568, 574-75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (burden of covenant to use
property solely for low-income housing touches and concerns); Callahan v. Weiland, 291 Ala. 183,
188, 279 So. 2d 451, 455 (1973) (covenant forbidding construction of "multi-unit projects" held to
bar building of condominium); Little v. Hunter, 289 Ala. 6, 14-15, 265 So. 2d 441,448 (1972) (prom-
ise not to subdivide property runs); Singer v. Wong, 35 Conn. Supp. 640, 643-55, 404 A.2d 124, 126
(Super. Ct. 1978) (covenant forbidding use of premises as retail shopping center runs); Thodos v.
Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 177, 79 N.W.2d 733, 736 (1956) (restriction that only buildings costing more
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One type of covenant not to do an act on the promisor's land, the
covenant not to compete, has given courts some trouble, but this diffi-
culty relates more to the issue of intent than to the requirement of touch
and concern. A court can interpret a promise not to operate a competing
business in two ways. The court can read the covenant as one intended
only to prevent the promisor from opening a competing business. If so,
the parties intend the promise to be personal 02 and there is no need to
determine whether its burden touches and concerns. Covenants not in-
tended to run will not run even if they touch and concern. 10 3
On the other hand, the court can construe the covenant as a promise
that no one will operate a competing business on the specified land. So
read, the covenant does not differ in any important way from a covenant
not to erect a building. Both promises are more efficiently performed by
the person holding possessory rights in the land than by the original
promisor. The burden of a covenant intended to prevent anyone from
using the land to compete with the promisee should and does run with
the land. 1°4
than $3000 may be built runs); Fishback v. Dozier, 362 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Ky. 1962) (covenant
forbidding construction of filling station runs); Cook v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 281 S.W.2d
415, 418-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) (same); Paine v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 736 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1987) (covenant forbidding construction of motel runs); Orange & Rockland Util. v.
Philwold Estates, Inc., 52 N.Y.2d 253, 263-66, 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1314-15, 437 N.Y.S.2d 291, 295-97
(1981) (burden of covenant not to use land for anything but hydro-electric plant touches and con-
cerns, but covenant is void as against public policy); Bodin v. Kinne, 128 A.D.2d 931, 512 N.Y.S.2d
737 (1987) (burden of covenant restricting land to mink raising not challenged on touch and concern
grounds); Rome v. Rehfuss, 391 Pa. 82, 137 A.2d 233 (1958) (burden of covenant not to build more
than one dwelling on land runs, but court does not strictly enforce because of changed circumstances
of surrounding land); Albright v. Fish, 136 Vt. 387, 393, 394 A.2d 1117, 1120 (1978) (promise not to
subdivide runs); Leighton v. Leonard, 22 Wash. App. 136, 139, 589 P.2d 279, 281 (1978) (mutual
agreement not to build tall buildings binds subsequent purchaser); cf. Dierberg v. Wills, 700 S.W.2d
461, 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (covenant forbidding construction of any building except for one-
family residence held not to prohibit construction of parking lot).
102. See Keller v. California Liquid Gas Corp., 363 F. Supp. 123, 126-27 (D. Wyo. 1973); Hyde
v. Liebelt, 394 N.W.2d 888, 890-91 (S.D. 1986).
103. However, as Stoebuck notes, the fact that a covenant touches and concerns might help to
persuade a court that the parties intended the promise to run. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 875. The
two elements, however, cannot be merged into one, because intent presents a question of fact for the
jury, while touch and concern involves a determination of law left to the judge.
104. E.g., Doo v. Packwood, 265 Cal. App. 2d 752, 756, 71 Cal. Rptr. 477, 480 (1968); Whitin-
sville Plaza, Inc. v. Kotseas, 378 Mass. 85, 97, 390 N.E.2d 243, 249-50 (1979); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Fall
River Hous. Auth., 364 Mass. 492, 500, 306 N.E.2d 257, 262-63 (1974); Lipton Professional Soccer,
Inc. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, 8 Mass. App. 458, 468, 395 N.E.2d 470,
475 (1979); Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Arnold Constable Corp., 105 N.J. Super. 14, 31-32, 250
A.2d 792, 801 (Ch. Div. 1969); Silverstein v. Shell Oil Co., 40 A.D.2d 34, 36-37, 337 N.Y.S.2d 442,
445-46 (1972), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 950, 309 N.E.2d 131, 353 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1974); John & Sal's Auto-
motive Serv., Inc. v. Montesano, 197 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Quadro Stations, Inc. v.
Gilley, 7 N.C. App. 227, 235, 172 S.E.2d 237, 242 (1970); Gillen-Crow Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Mandzak, 5 Ohio St. 2d 201, 205, 215 N.E.2d 377, 380 (1966); see also J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER,
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The other half of this first group of covenants consists of promises to
perform affirmative acts rather than promises to refrain from acts. For
example, a landowner might promise his neighbor that he and subse-
quent owners will keep a drainage ditch in good repair. To allocate that
burden efficiently, a court should enforce the covenant against the cur-
rent occupant rather than against the former possessor (the promisor).
Either party might maintain the ditch, and no reason exists for presum-
ing that the new owner is better able to do so than the former owner.
Indeed, the successor may be less able, not having expressly chosen to
take on the obligation. But aside from arguably irrelevant personal at-
tributes, two reasons support the supposition that the person in posses-
sion can perform the covenant more efficiently than the original
promisor. First, the possessor is more likely to observe deterioration of
the ditch; 05 by imposing the burden on the promisor instead of the new
owner, the court might greatly increase the cost of monitoring.
Second, not only can the successor monitor the ditch more easily; he
can also maintain it more efficiently. Maintenance requires access to and
control of the land,10 6-powers not held by the promisor. The promisor
could seek to buy the right to enter and work on the ditch from the
supra note 30, at 1044; Comment, Covenants Not to Compete-Do They Pass?, 4 CAL. W.L. REv.
131, 133-34 (1968). But see Shell Oil Co. v. Henry Ouellette & Sons, 352 Mass. 725, 727-29, 227
N.E.2d 509, 511-12 (1967) (covenant preventing establishment of competing service station on adja-
cent land does not run), overruled, Whitinsville Plaza, 378 Mass. at 97, 390 N.E.2d at 250; In re
Turners Crossroad Dev. Co., 277 N.W.2d 364, 371-72 (Minn. 1979) (covenant prohibiting construc-
tion of restaurant or liquor establishment does not run); Kerrick v. Schoenberg, 328 S.W.2d 595, 601
(Mo. 1959) (agreement not to sell nearby land for filling stations does not run); Bill Wolf Petroleum
Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 314, 316-17, 333 N.Y.S.2d 472, 476-77
(Sup. Ct. 1972) (requirements contract limiting purchase of petroleum products from single oil dis-
tributor does not run), modified, 41 A.D.2d 950, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1973); RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 537 comment f (1944).
105. The new owner visits his land more often; while there, he may notice problems. The origi-
nal promisor would have to make special trips to the land, and even then might not notice the
problems as quickly. The promisor could, of course, pay the new owner to monitor and report the
condition of the ditch. But the costs of reporting, combined with the costs of negotiating an agree-
ment for that service, could easily exceed the cost of the simple task involved.
106. The decision in Miller v. Clary, 210 N.Y. 127, 132-35, 103 N.E. 1114, 1116-17 (1913)
(burden of affirmative covenant does not run), indicates that courts are aware of the importance of
access when they consider who should perform a covenant. Although the court saw the question as
a choice between placing the cost of performance on the successor or on the promisee, rather than as
a choice between the promisor and his successor, the court considered the fact of access when it
allocated the burden. The court stressed that the promisee had an easement allowing access to a mill
before it decided that there was no reason to impose the burden on the promisors successor rather
than the promisee. The court's opinion thus recognized both that efficiency of performance might
critically influence whether a covenant runs and that access to the place of performance might influ-
ence the efficiency comparison.
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landowner, but the costs of negotiating the purchase price,10 7 when ad-
ded to the costs involved in drafting the instrument to transfer the rights,
seem far out of proportion to the costs of ditch upkeep. Moreover, the
landowner will suffer a loss of privacy if someone else monitors and
maintains the ditch. Alternatively, the promisor could pay the land-
owner to perform the promise, but that too would require an additional
transaction, which would include negotiating, transferring the right,
monitoring performance, and establishing security. Placing the burden
with the new landowner would avoid all those costs. The promisor could
also ask the current landowner to repair the ditch at the promisor's ex-
pense. But this alternative generates its own inefficiency: the "moral
hazard" problem. The landowner will have no incentive to minimize
ditch repair costs because someone else (i.e., the original promisor) will
pay the bill.108 For these reasons, a court can reasonably assume that
imposing the obligation of ditch repair on the current landowner rather
than the original promisor will lead to more efficient performance. 10 9
The efficient allocation approach predicts that other promises to
perform an act on the promisor's land will, like ditch maintenance, ordi-
narily touch and concern and therefore run with the land. Abundant
decisions confirm this prediction. Burdens that touch and concern have
arisen from a landowner's promise to repair and maintain buildings, 110 to
apply insurance proceeds toward reconstruction of a burned building, 11
107. The negotiators must agree on the scope and duration of the rights of access. The promisor
would probably want to negotiate a long-term right of access to prevent the successor from extorting
a large price for performance in the future. Negotiating such a long-term right could prove costly.
Common law judges, having seen a greater number of ridiculous property disputes than most layper-
sons, may have a healthy respect for the difficulty of negotiating such an agreement for a right of
entry onto land.
108. The current owner will waste resources by making higher-quality repairs (by using decora-
tive tiles, for example) than he would be willing to underwrite.
109. The efficiency hypothesis thus explains a recent decision, Moseley v. Bishop, 470 N.E.2d
773, 777 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), in which the court found that an eighteenth-century promise to
maintain a drainage ditch did touch and concern the underlying land. The court, however, held that
the burden did not run to those successors of the promisor who did not own land crossed by the
ditch because the burden did not touch and concern their land. The efficiency test makes sense of
this result. The successors with land not traversed by the ditch had no advantage of either access or
control that would allow the court to presume that allocating the burden to them would result in
more efficient performance than allocating it to the original promisor would.
110. See Ring v. Mayberry, 168 N.C. 563, 565, 84 S.E. 846, 847 (1915) (covenant to build stair-
way on promisor's land to serve promisee's building enforced by promisee against promisor's
successor).
111. See Voight v. Southern Ohio Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 63 Ohio App. 56, 60-61, 25 N.E.2d
304, 305-06 (1939) (landlord entitled to have proceeds of insurance devoted to erecting building
similar to one destroyed by fire because, according to court, promise to rebuild benefits tenant as
well); see also Arroyo v. Marlow, 122 A.D.2d 821, 822-23, 505 N.Y.S.2d 892, 894 (1986) (burden of
stipulation in court settlement requiring landlord to restore fire-damaged premises to habitable con-
dition runs with land).
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to bury a pipeline and tear down a drilling pad,' 12 to build and maintain
fences, 113 to construct a roadway, 114 to maintain a water flume," 5 to sup-
ply steam, 1 6 to repair a dam or canal, 17 to maintain a station or cross-
ing, 11 8 to build a golf course," 9 and to operate a first-class department
store.120 As efficiency analysis would suggest, courts repeatedly find that
these promises to perform an act on the promisor's land satisfy the touch
and concern requirement.
Occasionally, however, courts have found that promises to do an act
on a promisor's land do not satisfy the requirement, but the efficiency
hypothesis can also explain these exceptions. In the nineteenth century,
railroads often agreed to supply transportation to landowners in ex-
change for an interest in lands on which rails would be laid.12' The rail-
roads would perform these promises by carrying persons and packages
over rails laid on the promisor's lands, or at least on lands to which the
promisor had access. But unlike the situation with other promises per-
formed on the land, the efficiency gains in allocating these covenants to
112. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1967) (covenant enforced
by successor to promisee against promisors successor, who owned mineral rights and appurtenant
surface easements). Although the promisor in Mobil Oil would not have faced any access problem if
he were held liable on the promise (he had access to the drilling pad via the promisee's land), he
could not have destroyed the pad without permission of the promisor's successor, the pad's new
owner. Therefore, the promisor, if found responsible for performing the promise, would have con-
fronted substantial bargaining problems similar to those faced by an original promisor held liable on
a promise requiring performance on the successor's land.
113. See 3 H. TiFFANY, supra note 15, § 854, at 457 n.68. Fence cases ought to depend on
whether the fence is on the land of, and therefore belongs to, the promisor or the promisee. The
conclusion that the promise to repair touches and concerns should apply only to fences that lie upon,
and form part of, the land of the promisor, because only those fences could not be mended by the
original promisor unless he negotiated with his successor for a right of access to the fence.
114. See In re Wildflower Landholding Ass'n, 49 Bankr. 246, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985);
Hunt v. DelCollo, 317 A.2d 545, 550 (Del. Ch. 1974).
115. See Beckham v. Ward County Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 278 S.W. 316, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.
1925).
116. See Rhinelander Real Estate Co. v. Cammeyer, 216 A.D. 299, 304, 214 N.Y.S. 284, 289
(1926),
117. See 3 H. TIFFANY, supra note 15, § 854, at 457 n.67.
118. See id. at 457-58 nn.69-70; see also Moule Indus. v. Sheffield Steel Prods., 105 So. 2d 798,
801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (promise to maintain railroad lines runs), cert. denied, 111 So. 2d 41
(Fla. 1959); Boston & M.R.R. v. Construction Mach. Corp., 346 Mass. 513, 518-21, 194 N.E.2d 395,
399-400 (1963) (promise to light platforms, ramps, and access ways and to clear away snow runs).
119. See Lowenburg v. City of Saraland, 489 So. 2d 562, 565 (Ala. 1986).
120. See Net Realty Holding Trust v. Franconia Properties, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 759, 762 (E.D.
Va. 1982) (burden of covenant to operate first-class department store in mall enforced against succes-
sor occupant).
121. Sometimes a grant to a railroad was made in fee simple (both absolute and determinable,
see Missouri K.T.R.R. v. Taub, 345 S.W.2d 442, 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)); other times, only an
easement was transferred, see Annotation, Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or Ease-
ment, 6 A.L.R.3d 973 (1966).
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the successor would seem de minimis. Although, as owner of the rights
of way, the tracks, and the trains, the successor railroad was ultimately
the only entity capable of performing the promise, no major efficiency
gains would accrue from a decision to place the burden on the successor
railroad rather than the promisor. Common-carrier rules took the right
to exclude others from using trains out of the railroad's hands, and gave
it to the public instead. By removing the railroad's right to exclude land-
owners, the rules thus eliminated the costs of any negotiation over access.
Furthermore, because the successor railroad had already set and pub-
lished its prices, the parties had no need to negotiate over the price of
performance. By paying the fare, the original promisor could force the
railroad to provide transportation without incurring any additional
transaction costs. 122
The key factor here, though, is not the railroad's common-carrier
status. Rather, it is the nature of the covenant and the availability of a
performer whom the promisor can hire as easily as can his successor that
removes any reason to suppose that placing the burden on the successor
would eliminate substantial transaction inefficiencies. 123 As the efficiency
view of touch and concern predicts, the courts usually hold that the obli-
gation to provide transportation does not run. 124 It seems ironic that
courts will not enforce a covenant to provide common-carrier services
against the only entity capable of providing such services, but no effi-
ciency-related reasons justify shifting the burden of the covenant to the
carrier. Courts, therefore, should find that the burden does not touch
and concern.
Thus, courts generally find that promises to do or not to do some-
thing on a promisor's land satisfy the touch and concern requirement.
The efficient allocation hypothesis explains this result, as well as the oc-
casional exceptions.
122. Cases involving promises to provide a pass rather than the transportation itself illustrate
that the ownership of the land does not facilitate performance. See Ruddick v. St. Louis K. & N.W.
Ry., 116 Mo. 25, 30, 22 S.W. 499, 500 (1893) (covenant to furnish free pass would not have run if
not coupled to forfeiture clause); Eddy v. Hinnant, 82 Tex. 354, 357, 18 S.W. 562, 563 (1891)
(breach of covenant to furnish pass does not give rise to action for damages against successor rail-
road, only to action against promisor railroad).
123. Because the focus of inquiry remains on the nature of the covenant rather than on the status
of the defendant, this rule should not stifle sales to common carriers.
124. See Dickey v. Kansas City & I.R.T. Ry., 122 Mo. 223, 231,-26 S.W. 685, 687 (1894) (alter-
native holding that burden does not run to successor railroad because covenant is in no way con-
nected to land); see also Ruddick, 116 Mo. at 30, 22 S.W. at 500 (covenant to furnish free pass would
not have run if not coupled to forfeiture clause). Compare Eddy, 82 Tex. at 357, 18 S.W. at 354
(breach of covenant to furnish pass does not give rise to action for damages against successor rail-
road) with Munro v. Syracuse, L. & N. Ry., 200 N.Y. 224, 231, 93 N.E. 516, 519 (1910) (burden of
covenant to provide pass runs with land because condition subsequent that pass must be provided
runs with land). In neither Eddy nor Munro did the court discuss the touch and concern element.
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b. Promisee's land. Sometimes, a covenant promises that an act
will be done on the promisee's land rather than the promisor's. For ex-
ample, in a 1935 South Carolina case, Epting v. Lexington Water Power
Co., a purchaser of land with a stream that supplied water power prom-
ised that he would furnish electricity to the seller at his next business
location. 125 Like railroad transportation, electricity can be purchased on
terms that do not require substantial negotiation. The efficiency ap-
proach would thus predict the same result in Epting as in the railroad
cases: the court should find that the burden of the covenant does not
touch and concern the promisor's land. Indeed, this prediction proves
accurate. In spite of the close relationship in Epting between the burden
and the land (the defendant generated electricity with water that covered
the land in question), the court held that the burden did not run to the
successor because the covenant did not touch and concern. 126
Courts have found that promises to provide a promisee's land with
water, as opposed to electricity, do touch and concern, and hence run
with, the promisor's land. 127 In those cases, the promisor promises large
amounts of water and has the only adequate water source near the place
of performance, the promisee's land.1 28 Either the burdened land would
supply the water, or it would come from more distant sources; when
large amounts of water are involved, transportation costs become signifi-
cant.129 If a court holds the promisor personally liable, he will either
bear these transportation costs, resulting in inefficient performance, or
125. 177 S.C. 308, 317-21, 181 S.E. 66, 70-71 (1935) (burden of covenant to supply electrical
power does not run to promisor's successor because it does not touch and concern land). But see
Casperson v. Meech, 583 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1978) (dicta) (covenant to provide electricity and water
to promisee's land runs).
126. Epting, 177 S.C. at 317, 181 S.E. at 70.
127. See, e.g., Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. v. McKinney, 124 Ga. 929, 932, 53 S.E. 701, 702 (1906)
(burden of covenant to supply water from springs to neighboring land touched and concerned land
with springs and thus was enforced against promisor's successor); see Murphy v. Kerr, 5 F.2d 908,
910 (8th Cir. 1925) (covenant to pump water upon promisee's demand from darn on promisor's land
to irrigation reservoir on promisee's land through pipes and connections operated from promisor's
land enforced by promisee against promisor's successor); Cooke v. Chilcott, 3 Ch. D. 694, 700 (1876)
(burden of covenant to supply up to 65 gallons of water per day from well to neighboring land runs).
Neither Murphy nor Cooke mentioned the touch and concern element. See also Kerrick v. Schoen-
berg, 328 S.W.2d 595, 601 (Mo. 1959) (covenant to supply dirt for landfill from adjacent property
runs); cf Casperson, 583 P.2d at 218 (dicta) (covenant to provide electricity and water to land of
promisee runs). But ef Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 47 A.D.2d 835, 365 N.Y.S.2d 885, aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d
505, 349 N.E.2d 816, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717 (1976) (holding successor not bound by promise to pay
money for water supplied to land, but opining that, in absence of showing that land would be with-
out water, covenant to provide water for seasonal use does not touch and concern).
128. See Murphy, 5 F.2d at 910; Cooke, 3 Ch. D. at 695.
129. In the absence of an existing pipeline or canal for distribution, transportation costs for large
amounts of water are high because of the weight and bulk of water relative to its purchase price at
the source. A court may reasonably presume that it is more efficient to take water from its nearest
source than to truck it from distant sources or build a parallel pipeline.
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negotiate with his successor for performance of the covenant. In the
event of such a negotiation, society will suffer additional rent-seeking and
information-gathering costs. Therefore, even if the promise to supply
water to the promisee's land allows the water to come from any available
source, a court should find that the burden of the covenant to supply
water, at least to some rural locations, touches and concerns the nearest
land with an adequate water supply.130
In some of these water cases, courts have found that the covenant at
issue called for provision of water from a specific source on the prom-
isor's land. 131 If the parties had in fact intended provision of particular
water, the efficient allocation hypothesis would predict the result in these
cases as well. As with most covenants performed on the promisor's land,
the person holding the water source can more readily perform a covenant
to supply specified water than can the original promisor. But some
courts have found an intent to require particular water even where it
seems unlikely that the original promisee cared about the source.132
Although these courts reached the correct result-that the burden ran
with the land-they had to add a gloss to the terms of the covenant in
order to reach that result under traditional formulations of the touch and
concern test.133 The efficiency hypothesis, on the other hand, would ex-
plain the result without distorting the parties' intent.
The hypothesis predicts that promises to perform some service on
the promisee's land would touch and concern when the promisee can hire
no existing business as an alternative performer. On the other hand, if
the service is commercially available, the burden should not touch and
concern; at least some of the cases so hold.1 34
130. See infra note 132; cf Nicholson v. 300 Broadway Realty Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 240, 246, 164
N.E.2d 832, 835, 196 N.Y.S.2d 945, 950 (1959) (burden of covenant to provide heat to neighbor-
promisee touches and concerns). But cf. Atlanta, K. & N. Ry., 124 Ga. at 934, 53 S.E. at 703 (finding
that covenant to supply water from springs touches and concerns, as efficiency view would predict,
but adding in dictum that, if covenant had allowed water from any source, it would have been
personal, collateral, and would not have touched and concerned); Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co. v.
Hinton, 159 Ind. 398, 401, 64 N.E. 224, 225 (1902) (burden of covenant to furnish natural gas for
heat and light runs to successor of lessee of rights to drill for gas and oil).
131. See, e.g., Atlanta, K. & N. Ry., 124 Ga. at 931-32, 53 S.E. at 702; see also Indiana Natural
Gas, 159 Ind. at 401, 64 N.E. at 225 (covenant to pay delay rentals in oil and gas lease runs);
Kerrick, 328 S.W.2d at 601 (covenant to supply dirt for landfill from adjacent property runs).
132. See Atlanta, K. & N. Ry., 124 Ga. at 930-31, 53 S.E. at 701-02 (parties intended that water
would be supplied only from springs on promisor's land); see also Murphy, 5 F.2d at 910 (covenant
to provide water for irrigation interpreted to require water from specific source on promisor's land).
133. A's promise that the owner of his land will always supply water, from no particular source,
to B's land does not seem to touch and concern A's land. Only using the efficiency analysis might
one come to the conclusion that it does.
134. See, e.g., Epting v. Lexington Water Power Co., 177 S.C. 308, 320-21, 181 S.E. 66, 71
(1935) (burden of covenant to supply electrical power does not touch and concern and does not run
to promisor's successor); cf Coulter v. Sausalito Bay Water Co., 122 Cal. App. 480, 495, 10 P.2d
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2. Promises Performed off the Land. The last category of cases
comprises those in which a covenant can be performed away from the
lands of both the promisor and the promisee. A common example is a
promise to pay a sum certain to, or on behalf of, the promisee. A person
who has no interest in a particular piece of land can perform such a
promise as easily and efficiently as a person with such an interest. For
that reason, the efficient allocation hypothesis predicts that such an obli-
gation will not touch and concern the land.13 5 If there is no reason to
presume that moving the burden of the promise to the succeeding land-
holder will result in efficiency gains of any sort, under the hypothesis one
would expect a court to refrain from holding the successor to the
obligation.
As the efficiency hypothesis predicts, promises to pay money do not
ordinarily touch and concern the promisor's land.136 To take a simple
example, a purchaser's promise to pay for land does not bind his succes-
sor.137 Likewise, the burden of a purchaser's promise to pay a seller's
780, 785 (1932) (burden of covenant to supply water in area where utility supplied water to all
buildings did not run to successor, but covenant nonetheless was enforced in equity).
135. It must be noted here that one of the potential inefficiencies associated with attaching
promises to land does not arise as readily with promises to pay money. Both a promisor and his
successor can easily evaluate the implications of a promise to pay money. One might question,
therefore, whether the courts should apply touch and concern to monetary promises. Nevertheless,
courts do apply the requirement, and the efficient allocation hypothesis explains the outcomes.
Potential inefficiencies do exist, however. If either the dominant or servient parcel is subdivided
and the promise to pay money runs, the new owners may engage in costly rent seeking in an effort to
decide who holds what portion of the benefit or burden. Such disputes are avoided when the promise
touches and concerns the land, as exemplified by the ditch maintenance case, supra note 109.
136. See, e.g., Chesapeake Ranch Club, Inc. v. C.R.C. United Members, Inc., 60 Md. App. 609,
616, 483 A.2d 1334, 1337-38 (1984) (promise to pay membership dues for use of social and recrea-
tional facilities connected to subdivision does not touch and concern or run); Plaza Inv. Co. v. Abel,
8 Mich. App. 19, 34, 153 N.W.2d 379, 386 (1967) (promise to reimburse tenant for damages caused
by leaky roof does not run); Chasan v. Village Dist. of Eastman, 128 N.H. 807, 817-18, 523 A.2d 16,
22-23 (1986) (promise to charge only agreed-upon tax for water supplied does not run); Longley-
Jones Assocs. v. Ircon Realty Co., 67 N.Y.2d 346, 348, 493 N.E.2d 930, 931, 502 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707
(1986) (promise to pay commission if lease extended or renewed does not run); Eagle Enters. v.
Gross, 47 A.D.2d 835, 836, 365 N.Y.S.2d 885, 888 (1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 509-10, 349 N.E.2d
816, 819-20, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1976) (promise to pay for water supplied to land does not run);
Nassau County v. Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208, 215 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (burden of covenant to
pay dues to "sort of a property owners' association" treated as ordinary promise to pay money and
thus held not to touch and concern or run); Mullendore Theatres, Inc. v. Growth Realty Investors
Co., 39 Wash. App. 64, 66, 691 P.2d 970, 972 (1984) (burden of covenant to refund security deposit
at expiration of lease does not touch and concern or run). But see Peto v. Korach, 17 Ohio App. 2d
20, 24, 244 N.E.2d 502, 506 (1969) (promise to pay one-third of cost of upkeep of common sewer
line runs with land); cf Ball v. Rio Grande Canal Co., 256 S.W. 678, 682 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923)
(promise, secured by lien, to pay irrigation company runs with land).
137. See Lisenby v. Newton, 120 Cal. 571, 573, 52 P. 813, 814 (1898) (promise to pay for land
does not run because money does not issue from land and is not expended for benefit of land); see
also Lingle Water User's Ass'n v. Occidental Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 Wyo. 41, 56-60, 297 P. 385,
389-91 (1931) (without discussing touch and concern, court holds that, because promise to pay debt
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existing debts will not pass to the next purchaser; 138 nor do covenants to
pay real estate brokers' commissions and lawyers' fees touch and
concern.139
Traditional formulations of the touch and concern requirement offer
little explanation for these cases. Under the traditional Bigelow-Clark
definition, 140 a promise to pay a debt for improvements to realty should
touch and concern the land because the obligation to pay the debt will
diminish the burdened parcel's value. Because a debt incurred for im-
provement seems beneficial to the land and related to its use and enjoy-
ment, a court should find that the promise touches and concerns. But at
least one court has found such a promise not to touch and concern the
land. 141 The efficiency hypothesis explains this failure to attach any im-
portance to the purposes for which the debt was incurred: the use to
which the borrowed funds were put has no bearing on the efficient alloca-
tion of the promise to repay the debt.
Courts have usually found that homeowners' association dues, un-
like most other promises to pay money, do touch and concern the prom-
isor's land. These decisions initially seem to undercut the efficiency
underlying mortgage does not run, promise to pay debt associated with purchase of appurtenant
water rights does not run); cf Kelly v. Tri-Cities Broadcasting, Inc., 147 Cal. App. 3d 666, 679, 195
Cal. Rptr. 303, 311 (1983) (promise to submit to binding arbitration regarding rent touches and
concerns).
138. See Schram v. Coyne, 127 F.2d 205, 209 (6th Cir.) (agreement to assume and pay mortgage
held not to be covenant running with land), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 652 (1942); Beaver v. Ledbetter,
269 N.C. 142, 147, 152 S.E.2d 165, 170 (1967) (mortgage assumption clause in deed is not covenant
running with land, but is collateral undertaking, personal in nature and not relating to land); Wells
v. Benton, 108 Ind. 585, 591-92, 8 N.E. 444, 447 (covenant to pay for land by paying off judgment
against grantor is personal undertaking and therefore not covenant running with land; not clear if
touch and concern or intent is basis for holding), aff'd on rehg, 108 Ind. 593, 9 N.E. 601 (1886); see
also City of Douglas v. Catrett, 109 Ga. App. 683, 686, 137 S.E.2d 358, 361 (1964) ("The agreement
to pay damages neither touched nor concerned the land."); Dolph v. White, 12 N.Y. 296 (1855)
(lessee's covenant to pay outstanding note is collateral); Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York & Q.C.
Ry., 253 N.Y 190, 199-200, 170 N.E. 887, 890 (mortgagor's covenant to subject future acquired
property to mortgage is collateral), reh'g denied, 254 N.Y. 126, 172 N.E. 264, appeal dismissed, 282
U.S. 803 (1930); Gower v. Postmaster-General, 57 L.T.R. 527, 530 (Ch. 1887) (tenant's covenant to
pay taxes on lessor's unleased land does not touch and concern).
139. See Silver v. Abbot Realty, Inc., 249 So. 2d 38, 38-39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); James
Talcott, Inc. v. Roy D. Warren Commercial, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 544, 545-46, 171 S.E.2d 907, 908-09
(1969); Spivak v. Madison-54th Realty Co., 60 Misc. 2d 483, 486-87, 303 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132-33 (Sup.
Ct. 1969); Blasser v. Cass, 158 Tex. 560, 562-63, 314 S.W.2d 807, 809 (1958); Latses v. Nick Floor,
Inc., 99 Utah 214, 224-25, 104 P.2d 619, 624 (1940).
140. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
141. See Pelser v. Gingold, 214 Minn. 281, 287, 8 N.W.2d 36, 40 (1943) (burden of covenant to
pay promisee's personal debts incurred for improvements to land does not touch and concern and
thus does not run). The American Law of Property recognizes that the result may turn on whether
the improvements have already been made, but offers little explanation for that distinction. 2 AMER-
ICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 15, § 9.13(b), at 380-82.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
hypothesis. Leaving aside any de minimis advantages from proximity, 142
there is no obvious reason to presume that performance by the current
landholder will result in any substantial efficiency gains. But a closer
look at the situation reveals a substantial danger of inefficiency from
holding the original promisor liable on such covenants. Homeowners'
associations offer a solution to a bargaining difficulty that arises with re-
spect to neighborhood improvement projects. Without an organization
that has the power to tax its members, owners have no means of compel-
ling other owners to pay for improving and maintaining common areas.
Each owner's self-interest dictates that she refuse to contribute volunta-
rily because any contribution redounds in part to the benefit of her neigh-
bors and she can enjoy the benefits of her neighbors' contributions
regardless of her decision. Just as constitutions grant power to state and
national governments to tax in order to provide for the security of all,
covenants among owners of neighborhood lots establish, by private
agreement, a small, majority-rule government with the power to assess
dues from all its citizens for the purpose of making mutually beneficial
improvements. Citizenship, and the right to vote, in this private govern-
ment is conferred automatically upon the purchase of a lot within the
scheme.
The touch and concern issue arises after a lot has been transferred to
a new owner. A court must decide whether the new owner should be
bound by the old owner's promise to pay dues. Aside from concerns for
its own time and resources, two efficiency issues confront the court. As
Epstein has observed, 143 a ruling that such covenants do not touch and
concern will greatly diminish the value and discourage the use of servi-
tudes as a means of overcoming problems that arise as land use intensi-
fies. A court that desires to make the law more efficient by reducing
disincentives to private resolution of conflicts should, therefore, hold that
such covenants touch and concern. But were that the ultimate goal,
courts would abandon touch and concern entirely. 144 The efficiency hy-
pothesis says that touch and concern decisions work to promote the effi-
ciency of the situation at hand and others like it, rather than the
efficiency of servitude law at large. In the case of homeowners' associa-
tions, courts can allocate the burden of assessments either to those who
have expressly agreed to pay or to their successors. Since the successors,
as current "citizens" in the associations, make the decisions to assess
dues, judicial decisions that such covenants do not run would result in
142. The landowner can deliver the homeowners' association dues payment in person without
going to the post office or buying a stamp.
143. See Covenants and Constitution- supra note 8, at 907-08.
144. See id.
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current landowners having the power to tax former landowners for im-
provements. In addition to being unfair, this situation would result in
too much spending on neighborhood improvements, i.e., a misallocation
of resources. 145 Holdings that the burdens of covenants to pay dues
run1 46 prevent possible overallocations of resources to improvement and
145. Even a proper allocation of the burden of paying dues does not ensure efficiency; a public
goods problem may arise. Each homeowner pays the average cost of the improvements, but receives
a marginal benefit unrelated to the average cost. If more than half of the members receive a margi-
nal benefit just greater than the average cost, they will undertake the improvement even when the
minority receives far lower marginal benefit than the average cost. In other words, even when those
who gain pay for the gains, the group may make inefficient decisions concerning improvements. It is
possible that the pro-spending error caused by allowing members to create costs borne by nonmem-
bers would counteract a preexisting anti-spending bias, and thereby improve overall efficiency.
However, since there is no reason to presume that the public goods problem more often creates a bias
against spending rather than in favor of spending, it seems appropriate to attempt to eliminate a bias
that can only work in favor of spending. Furthermore, it might be hoped that homeowners would
bargain among themselves to eliminate the general public goods problem.
146. E.g., Boyle v. Lake Forest Property Owners Ass'n, 538 F. Supp. 765, 769-70 (S.D. Ala.
1982) (burden of covenant to pay assessments runs to successor owners; court prevented free riders
by ignoring owner's attempt to withdraw from association); Lincoln v. Cherry Creek Homeowners
Ass'n, 30 Bankr. 905, 909 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (promise to pay assessments by association
touches and concerns and runs); Homsey v. University Gardens Racquet Club, 730 S.W.2d 763, 764-
65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (burden of covenant to pay assessments to Racquet Club runs to successor,
along with voting rights regarding expenditure of funds); Selected Lands Corp. v. Speich, 702
S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (covenant requiring property owner to pay maintenance fees
runs); Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d 565, 575-76, 295 P.2d 714, 720-21
(1956) (covenant to pay assessments enforced by homeowners' street maintenance commission
against promisor's successor who became member of commission automatically upon purchase of
land); see also United States v. Florea, 68 F. Supp. 367, 368-71 (D. Or. 1945) (burden of covenant to
pay assessments for reclamation works runs); Cerro de Alcala Homeowners Ass'n v. Burns, 169 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 1, 3-4, 216 Cal. Rptr. 84, 85-86 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1985) (absentee condo owner
bound to covenant to pay maintenance assessment because all rights of ownership not relinquished);
St. Paul Fed. Bank for Say. v. Wesby, 149 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1063-64, 501 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1986)
(condominium association members' covenant to pay for common expenses runs), appeal denied,
114 Ill. 2d 557, 508 N.E.2d 736 (1987); Rasp v. Hidden Valley Lake, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 153, 157 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988) (covenants requiring payment of water and sewer service by lot owners to developer
runs); Brendonwood Common v. Franklin, 403 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (covenants
requiring subdivision residents to pay assessments for maintenance expenses run); Essex Co. v.
Goldman, 357 Mass. 427, 431-32, 258 N.E.2d 526, 528-29 (1970) (covenant to pay perpetual annual
rent for mill power runs); Burton-Jones Dev. Inc. v. Flake, 368 Mich. 122, 130-35, 117 N.W.2d 110,
114-17 (1962) (covenant of subdivision owners to pay for improvements agreed to by majority of lot
owners runs); Rittenhouse Park Community Ass'n v. Katznelson, 223 N.J. Super. 595, 597-98, 539
A.2d 334, 335-36 (1987) (covenant requiring owners to pay assessment for maintenance of common
land in subdivision and creating lien in favor of community association upon default runs); Lincoln-
shire Civic Ass'n v. Beach, 46 A.D.2d 596, 597-98, 364 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (1975) (covenant requir-
ing landowners to become members of association to maintain common recreational facilities runs);
Lawrence Park Realty Co. v. Crichton, 218 A.D. 374, 376-77, 218 N.Y.S. 278, 280 (1926) (covenant
to pay proportionate share of maintenance costs runs); Starkey Point Property Owners' Ass'n v.
Wilson, 96 Misc. 2d 377, 379-81, 409 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (Yates Co. Ct. 1978) (covenant to pay
annual assessment for upkeep and maintenance of common areas touches and concerns anM runs);
Four Seasons Homeowners Ass'n v. Sellers, 62 N.C. App. 205, 210-11, 302 S.E.2d 848, 852-53
(same), cert. denied, 309 N.C. 461, 307 S.E.2d 364 (1983); Inwood North Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc.
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maintenance of common areas. Indeed, tying the burden to those in con-
trol of the spending prevents inefficient allocation of resources equally
well in cases where the funds might be spent on projects unrelated to the
land.147
Options to purchase present an interesting and difficult variation.
An option involves a promisor's undertaking to sell at an agreed price if
the purchaser-promisee decides to buy. Should this kind of covenant run
with a transfer of the land? After transfer of the land subject to option,
could the original promisor perform without substantial inefficiencies if
he were allocated the burden? Probably not. At the least, he would have
to negotiate with the successor before performing. Beyond that, the cur-
rent owner could hold up the promisor by insisting on a price far above
fair market value. If the solution is for a court to require the successor to
sell at fair market value, the court may impose the burden on the succes-
sor in the first place by letting the covenant run. If, as would surely be
the case, the court refused to force the successor's sale to the promisor so
that he could perform, the court would leave the original promisor to
deal with a monopolist. The efficiency analysis thus concludes that the
covenant should touch and concern; consistent with this view, courts
v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 635-36 (Tex. 1987) (same); ef Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of
Eugene, 627 F.2d 966, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1980) (burden of promise to pay assessments for road im-
provements runs with easement to successor of grantee; no discussion of touch and concern ele-
ment); Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owner's Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 759-60, 528 S.W.2d 651,
653 (1975) (covenant requiring payment of assessment does not run; members must pay anyway);
Anthony v. Brea Glenbrook Club, 58 Cal. App. 3d 506, 512, 130 Cal. Rptr. 32, 35 (1976) (covenant
requiring membership in homeowners' association runs with land); Paulinskill Lake Ass'n v. Em-
mich, 165 N.L Super. 43, 45, 397 A.2d 698, 699 (1978) (covenant requiring membership in home-
owners' association imposes no unreasonable restraint against alienation); Chimney Hill Owners'
Ass'n v. Antignani, 136 Vt. 446, 454-55, 392 A.2d 423, 428 (1978) (covenant to pay annual charge
for right to use common land runs). But see Nassau County v. Kensington Ass'n, 21 N.Y.S.2d 208,
215 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (burden of covenant to pay dues to "sort of a property owners' association" does
not touch and concern and does not run). The court in Nassau County stated that the "covenant
itself should provide that the land burdened by the payment should be benefitted when the money
collected... is expended" and that "defendant is not committed to use the funds for any particular
purpose or in fact to spend the money at all." Id. The court ignored the fact that those paying the
dues had control of the association and therefore could choose whether to use the assessments for the
benefit of the burdened parcels. Professor French explains this irregular result by arguing that the
promisee was guilty of overreaching. Reweaving, supra note 9, at 1290. But cf Beech Mountain
Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 294, 269 S.E.2d 178, 182-83 (1980) (homeown-
ers' association assessment not enforced against successor because, inter alia, covenant did not estab-
lish a standard specific enough to govern amounts of assessments).
147. See Homsey, 730 S.W.2d at 764 (burden of covenant to pay assessments to Racquet Club
runs to successor, along with voting rights regarding expenditure of funds). The efficiency view also
explains why the nonexclusivity of the club was not a material factor in the court's view: the non-
owner members had no vote.
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hold that the burdens of such promises run. 148
Promises to insure realty for the benefit of a promisee present an-
other tricky situation. Anyone can buy an insurance policy on a piece of
land. 149 For that reason, courts would generally be expected to find that
a covenant to insure does not touch and concern. As expected, where the
facts indicate that anyone could buy the policy in question, the courts
usually do hold that the covenant does not run.'5 Depending on the
realty, however, some possible uses of the land might substantially in-
crease the insurance premiums. In such cases, the efficiency hypothesis
would predict that a court would place the burden of insuring on the
successor in order to force him to internalize the increases in insurance
costs owing to his activities.151
Cases that involve the running of such burdens offer firm support for
the view that courts will find the burden to touch and concern whenever
allocating that burden to the original promisor would create possibilities
of opportunistic behavior or necessitate an additional transaction in per-
148. See, e.g., Keogh v. Peck, 316 Ill. 318, 327-29, 147 N.E. 266, 269 (1925) (burden of covenant
granting option to purchase reversion touches and concerns and runs with land interest to which
option applies; option enforced against landlord-promisor's successor); Texas Co. v. Butler, 198 Or.
368, 373, 256 P.2d 259, 262 (1953) ("The right to purchase the property, based upon a valuable
consideration, is a covenant that runs with the land ...."). But cf Shower v. Fisher, 47 Wash. App.
720, 727, 737 P.2d 291, 294-95 (1987) (option to purchase and right of first refusal might run;
remand to trial court to determine parties' intent).
149. Although the beneficiary must have an insurable interest, the purchaser need not. See 3
COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D §§ 24:101 to :110 (M. Rhodes rev. 2d ed. 1984).
150. See, e.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Penn Plate Glass Co., 186 U.S. 434, 453 (1902)
(burden of covenant in mortgage to keep property insured does not run to grantee who takes subject
to mortgage); The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468, 494 (1886) ("the insurance which a man has on
property is not an interest in the property itself"); Columbian Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.)
507, 511 (1836) (mortgagee has no right to proceeds of insurance policy underwritten by mortgagor
because policy does not touch land); Spillane v. Yarnalowicz, 252 Mass. 168, 171, 147 N.E. 571, 572
(1925) (burden of covenant to insure on behalf of mortgagee does not run); Kaplan v. Wilderman, 95
N.J. Eq. 463, 465, 123 A. 165, 165 (1924) (same); Rollman Corp. v. Goode, 137 Vt. 84, 88, 400 A.2d
968, 970 (1979) (covenant in mortgage to insure for the benefit of mortgagor does not run). But see
Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 76 F. 34 (7th Cir. 1896) (lessee's covenant to insure runs to his
assignee; lessor's insurance proceeds do not run to lessee); Thomas v. Von Kapff, 6 G. & J. 372, 381
(Md. 1834); Voight v. Southern Ohio Say. Bank & Trust Co., 63 Ohio App. 56, 56, 25 N.E.2d 304,
305 (1939) (lessee's covenant to insure runs to his assignee). In the oft-cited case of Masury v.
Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340, 348 (1859), the burden of a lease covenant to insure was held to run to a
tenant's assignee. Although the efficient allocation view fails to explain this result, the explanation
given by the court is equally inadequate. The court said that the proceeds would be used to rebuild
for the benefit of both landlord and tenant. But, according to the pleadings upon which the case was
decided, the covenant did not require the landlord to rebuild with the insurance proceeds. See id. at
345. Where the promisor also promises to rebuild with the proceeds, the covenant is best viewed as
one that must be performed on the land of the promisor. See Northern Trust, 76 F. at 37; Case Note,
Covenant to Insure Construed as Covenant to Pay Rent, 36 YALE L.J. 1187, 1187 (1927).
151. See St. Regis Restaurant, Inc. v. Powers, 219 A.D. 321, 325, 219 N.Y.S. 684, 688 (1927)
(lease covenant to pay for increased costs of insurance due to tenant's activities runs with land as part
of covenant to pay rent).
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forming it. A (shorter) discussion of the cases involving the running of
benefits follows.
C. Allocation of Benefits to Promote Efficiency.
Courts face the same theoretical question on the benefit side of a
covenant as on the burden side: to whom should the promise be allo-
cated? 152 Under the efficient allocation hypothesis, the analytical focus
on the benefit side should shift from efficiencies associated with perform-
ing the promise at issue to efficiencies associated with enjoying it. As the
efficiency hypothesis predicts, courts will find that a promise touches and
concerns when shifting the benefit to the successor will avoid a situation
fraught with potential for inefficient behavior, and the opposite finding
will result when the court can see no efficiency gains attending the run-
ning of the promise. For purposes of this analysis, the cases can be di-
vided along lines similar to those used in classifying the burden decisions.
Discussion of covenants involving performance on or near a promisee's
land precedes analysis of promises not necessarily performed near a
promisee's land.
Before this section reviews the cases, one point mentioned earlier
should be expanded. The touch and concern element carries less weight
on the benefit side of a covenant because contractual benefits are transfer-
able by ordinary assignment. 153 Thus, a party can separately assign a
benefit that does not touch and concern; the touch and concern require-
ment does not prevent a promisee from passing her rights to her succes-
sor. This point leaves open the question of how the benefit of a promise
should be allocated, however, because whether a promisee intended to
pass her rights is often at issue. The touch and concern requirement may
aid in resolving that issue. If a court has no reason to believe that the
successor is the more efficient holder of the benefit, then it should find
that the promise does not touch and concern and allocate the benefit to
the original promisee. The requirement thus serves as a method of deter-
mining the intent of the promisee and her successor at the time the prom-
152. See, e.g., Choisser v. Eyman, 22 Ariz. App. 587, 589, 529 P.2d 741, 743 (1974) (because
benefit of refund covenant does not run, original promisor can enforce); Meado-Lawn Homes, Inc. v.
Westchester Lighting Co., 171 Misc. 669, 671, 13 N.Y.S.2d 709, 712 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (because prom-
ise to refund money paid for gas main construction does not run, original promisee can enforce),
aff'd, 259 A.D. 810, 20 N.Y.S.2d 396, aff'd, 284 N.Y. 667, 30 N.E.2d 608 (1940).
153. See City of Reno v. Matley, 79 Nev. 49, 56, 378 P.2d 256, 259-60 (1963):
Most objections to upholding covenants as running with the land stem from the seeming
incongruity that permits a man, by making a promise, to bind another who subsequently
succeeds to land .... This difficulty, however, would seem to be more real than imagined
when we are dealing with the benefits, and not the burdens, of the covenant.
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isee transferred her interest in land.154
The analysis of the benefits cases first considers promises not to
build a structure in front of a set-back line. Assume that the promisee in
these cases is a neighbor with a picture-window view that such a struc-
ture would block. After the promisee sells the house with the picture
window, the new owner may call upon a court to enforce the covenant
not to build against the promisor. The court will then have the opportu-
nity to save society the costs associated with at least one transaction, by
correctly identifying the person who values the promise more highly. If
the court allocates the benefit of the promise to the person who values it
less, society will either suffer a loss of enjoyment equal to the difference
between the two valuations or bear the costs of the transfer to the person
who would enjoy the promise more.
Ignoring, as always, subjective differences between the two potential
beneficiaries, one fact remains. The new owner of the picture-window
view will observe the encroachment more often, and will probably suffer
more than the original promisee. Since the transferee-owner of the bene-
fited land is likely to value the promise more than the original promisee,
the efficiency analysis dictates that the promise should run. If the prom-
ise does not run, the successor could try to purchase the covenant from
the promisor or the promisee, but that would require an additional trans-
action. Allocating the benefit of the promise to the successor will avoid
the costs of that transaction. 155
Even if the court assumes that the successor and promisee are
equally likely to enjoy the promise, efficiencies of proximity favor placing
the benefit with the successor. The successor, because of his proximity to
the land, can more easily monitor the condition of the burdened parcel
and file any action necessary to obtain performance of the promise.
Moreover, the pleasant surprise that attends the running of a benefit to
154. See Reweaving, supra note 9, at 1289. Berger suggests this is the purpose on the burden side
of the covenant: the burden should touch and concern when an ordinary buyer would expect that he
would get the burden along with the land. Berger, supra note 30, at 208-09. Krier's suggestion, that
the burden should run when the court finds that the successors would be expected to adopt the
promise in the absence of transaction costs, would probably reach a similar result. See Krier, supra
note 28, at 1679. Both of these approaches dovetail with Epstein's approach. Epstein would allow
the touch and concern element to serve as a default address when the original parties fail to make
their intent clear. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. Either Berger's or Krier's test
would seem appropriate for defining how the touch and concern test could operate in such cases.
155. Bigelow adopted a similar approach in his seminal 1914 article, The Content of Covenants in
Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639, 645-46 (1914). He suggested that courts focus on whether the prom-
isor or the successor has the "primary interest" in the covenant. Professor Val Nolan's "would he
care?" test also suggests a concern for allocating of the benefit to the person likely to value it most
highly.
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the transferee is less likely to generate demoralization costs156 than a sur-
prise burden. Since demoralization costs are low, even a small efficiency
gain might suffice to overcome the presumption against running
promises.
As the efficiency hypothesis would predict, courts usually find that
benefits of promises that require performance near a promisee's land do
touch and concern.1 57 Such covenants have included an agreement with
neighbors not to build too close to the edge of a lot,158 an agreement not
,to build a dwelling whose floor level is more than a foot higher than
street level,159 an agreement not to use land for other than residential
purposes, 16° a promise to bury a pipeline under a promisee's surface es-
tate,161 a covenant to supply water to a promisee's land,162 a promise to
supply heat to a neighbor-promisee's building,1 63 a promise to tear down
a studio cottage,1 64 and an obligation to maintain a ditch that drains
water from a promisee's land.1 65
Promises not requiring performance near a promisee's land, on the
other hand, often fail to touch and concern. For example, in Bisbee v.
156. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1165, 1214-15, 1221-1223 (1967).
157. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d 951, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1967) (promisee's successor
enforces covenant to bury oil pipeline and to remove drilling structures from surface estate against
successor owner of mineral rights and appurtenant surface easements); see also Aronsohn v.
Mandara, 98 N.J. 92, 98-99, 484 A.2d 675, 678-79 (1984) (implied covenant of good workmanship in
constructing patio is assignable to promisee's purchasers); cf. Bodin v. Kinne, 128 A.D.2d 931, 512
N.Y.S.2d 737 (1987) (enforcement of covenant restricting land to mink raising not challenged on
touch and concern grounds).
158. See Day v. McEwen, 385 A.2d 790, 793 (Me. 1978) (benefit of covenant not to obstruct
ocean view runs to heir); Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., 100 N.M. 389, 391-92, 671 P.2d 637, 639-
40 (1983) (benefit of covenant not to build within 50 feet of street runs to successors of next-door
neighbors); supra text following note 154.
159. See Rodgers v. Reimann, 227 Or. 62, 67-69, 361 P.2d 101, 103-04 (1961).
160. See Huff v. Duncan, 263 Or. 408, 411, 502 P.2d 584, 585 (1972) (restriction to residential
use clearly touches and concerni land); cf Muldawer v. Stribling, 243 Ga. 673, 675, 256 S.E.2d 357,
359 (1979) (benefit of covenant not to have single-family-only property rezoned for other uses runs).
161. See Mobil, 385 F.2d at 953-54.
162. See Choisser v. Eyman, 22 Ariz. App. 587, 589, 529 P.2d 741, 743 (1974) (dictum);
Farmer's High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. New Hampshire Real Estate Co., 40 Colo. 467, 478,
92 P. 290, 293 (1907) (benefit of covenant to provide irrigation water via ditch for one dollar per inch
runs to successor of promisee); Martin v. City of Glens Falls, 27 Misc. 2d 925, 929, 210 N.Y.S.2d
372, 375 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (benefit of covenant to allow use of water from water line without payment
runs).
163. See Atlas Land Corp. v. Ettinger, 283 A.D. 379, 381, 128 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75, appeal denied,
283 A.D. 871, 129 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1954).
164. See Pioneer Improvement Ass'n v. Slattery, 69 A.D.2d 960, 960-96, 416 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87
(1979).
165. See Moseley v. Bishop, 470 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (benefit of 1896 covenant
to maintain drainage ditch tiles touches and concerns and runs with land drained by ditch).
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Spacht, 166 the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division faced a
dispute regarding the benefit of a promise to convey one-half of the min-
eral rights associated with a piece of land upon satisfaction of a purchase
money debt secured by the surface interest. The court held that the ben-
efit did not run because the right to obtain the mineral rights did not
touch and concern the surrounding land. 167 This result comports with
the efficiency hypothesis. There is no objective reason why the successor
would value the mineral rights any more highly than the promisee, and
no impediment prevents transfer of the rights even if the successor does
value them more highly. A holding allocating the benefit to the original
promisee would create no risk of opportunistic behavior; therefore, the
covenant should not run.
Just as the burden of a promise to pay money rarely demands reallo-
cation to prevent inefficient relationships, the benefit of a promise to pay
money need not attach to land in order to preserve efficiency. Preserving
the initial allocation of a right to receive money will not result in oppor-
tunistic behavior or necessitate another private transaction to place the
benefit in the most appreciative hands. Therefore, the benefit of a prom-
ise to pay should not touch and concern. And so some courts have
held. 168
In another New York case, Rossi v. Simms, 169 a landlord promised
not to charge a tenant the higher of two rental rates. The tenant trans-
ferred his interest to a successor, who tried to claim the benefit of the
covenant. The court held that the original parties lacked the necessary
intent to make the covenant run, but also noted that covenants concern-
ing payment of money usually do not touch and concern. 170 Once again,
the decision to leave the benefit with the original party creates no chance
of opportunistic behavior. Even if the old tenant could assert the right to
the lower rental rate, he would not receive the benefit. But he could sell
the right to either the new tenant or the landlord. Although minor nego-
166. 125 A.D.2d 982, 510 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1986).
167. Id at 983, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
168. E.g., Choisser v. Eyman, 22 Ariz. App. 587, 589, 529 P.2d 741, 743 (1974) (benefit of
covenant to refund money relating to water utility attachments did not run because, inter alia, it did
not touch and concern); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Baltimore-Gillet Co., 176 Md. 594, 598, 6 A.2d
226, 228 (1939) (benefit of covenant to refund part of fees for extending water mains did not run to
successor because did not touch and concern); Raintree Corp. v. Rowe, 38 N.C. App. 664, 670, 248
S.E.2d 904, 908 (1978) (benefit of covenant to pay country club dues does not run); Grimes v. Walsh
& Watts, Inc., 649 S.W.2d 724, 727-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (benefit of covenant to pay royalty
interest in oil lease on farm-out agreement does not run). But see Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d
1344, 1347 (Fla. 1980) (benefit of covenant to pay for maintenance of common facilities touches and
concerns).
169. 119 A.D.2d 137, 506 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1986).
170. Id. at 142, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 53.
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tiation costs might arise, no substantial inefficiencies would obtain. The
problem of collusion that would arise in an analogous case on the burden
side remains insignificant here, because the promisee can enforce the
promise even if the other two collude. The party holding the benefit,
unlike the party burdened, is not forced to deal with a monopolist. 171
The Second Circuit faced a particularly difficult money-payment
case not long after Clark had written his famous book on covenants. In
165 Broadway Building, Inc. v. City Investing Co., 172 Judge Clark found
that the benefits of two covenants did touch and concern land. He de-
cided that a promise to repay construction costs when the promisor dis-
continued his use of the constructed facility ran with the land. 173 But no
potential inefficiencies justified that half of the result. He also held that
the benefit of a promise to refund the purchase price of ticket choppers
after discontinuing their use (at either the promisor's or landowner's
election) touched and concerned the land. 174 Allocating that promise to
the original promisee, on the other hand, would have created incentives
for inefficient behavior on the part of other similarly situated successors
to promisees. After hearing that the covenant to refund the purchase
price of the ticket choppers would not run, a successor in the position of
the promisee's successor in 165 Broadway Building would be discouraged
from purchasing new choppers as needed (because he might not get the
refund), and also from discontinuing use of the facilities when the assets
were not producing adequate returns (because his calculations on chop-
per use would not include the opportunity for a refund upon cessation of
use). The efficiency approach thus suggests that one covenant should
have run, but not the other. The judges had no theory with which to
distinguish the two, however, and the decision split the panel. 175
The efficient allocation analysis explains many touch and concern
decisions with respect to both the burden and benefit sides of a promise.
If the facts of a case indicate that shifting a covenant to the succeeding
landholder would leave the potential parties (the promisor, promisee,
and successor(s)) in a situation less likely to generate wasteful opportu-
171. Compare Castle v. Double Time, Inc., 737 P.2d 900, 902 (Okla. 1986), in which the court
held that the benefit of a landlord's promise to renew a lease for five years touched and concerned the
land at issue and, therefore, ran to the tenant's successor. Because the successor tenant would likely
value the term more highly, the court was able to save the costs of a transaction by shifting the right
to renew along with the tenant's estate.
172. 120 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 682 (1941).
173. Id. at 819.
174. Id.
175. With a nice sleight of hand, Clark suggested that the then-current New York law may have
been somewhat more liberal than the prior New York decisions would indicate; those prior decisions
were part of a general trend that Clark himself had discerned. See id. at 818. In other words, the
common law had changed in the absence of any cases.
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nistic behavior, the court should and usually does find that the covenant
touches and concerns the land. If a decision to attach a promise appears
not to lessen inefficiency, courts usually find that the covenant does not
touch and concern, thereby preventing future opportunistic behavior
from interfering with negotiations for the detachment of bad promises.
To paraphrase Moli~re: "Good Heavens! For more than forty years
we have been speaking economics without knowing it."'176
IV. CONCLUSION
It is important to keep perspective on the efficiency- oriented analy-
sis attempted here. The primary goal has been'to offer a coherent de-
scription of the operation of touch and concern, an explanation that will
predict what results judges will reach when they apply the element in
future cases. To illuminate the actual operation of touch and concern
with economic analysis, however, is not to justify the touch and concern
requirement's existence. The larger normative question whether touch
and concern should be retained or eliminated turns on an evaluation of
several different factors, only one of which is analyzed in depth here.
The efficiency benefits that the element achieves in particular situations,
as identified in part III above, must be weighed against the negative in-
centives generated by the very existence of the rule and the tertiary costs
of implementing the rule through the judicial system.177 The increasing
importance of servitudes as a means of private land-use regulation justi-
fies attention to both descriptive and normative points. If courts con-
tinue to require promises to touch and concern, descriptions that help
lawyers to predict the application of the test will reduce disincentives to
the use of covenants and to the costs of resolving disputes involving servi-
tudes. And as increasingly intensive land use calls for more flexible pri-
vate means of coordinating conflicting uses, the overall utility of touch
and concern will call for more and more careful examination. That ex-
amination ought to include the particular benefits of specific applications,
as well as systemic incentive effects and costs of resolving disputes.
A few suggestions flow from the analysis in this Article. First, on a
purely doctrinal level, courts might improve the traditional articulation
of the touch and concern requirement by flipping it on its head. The
prevailing test asks whether the covenant at issue would add to the prom-
isee's enjoyment of the land or detract from the promisor's. Courts
176. Cf J. MoLti R, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME, act II, sc. iv, 1. 34 (1640) (Nilsson ed.
n.d.) ("Par ma foi! il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que j'en susse rien ....").
177. The costs of administering the rule include the costs, to the parties and the courts, of litiga-
tion that would not have occurred but for the presence of the touch and concern element within the
servitude doctrine.
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might define the touch and concern test more accurately and helpfully by
asking whether ownership of a particular parcel aids in the enjoyment or
performance of the covenant.
Beyond this, courts and commentators could further refine the test
by explicitly considering the various inefficiencies that are seemingly rec-
ognized in the cases. A checklist that covers transaction costs, possibili-
ties of opportunistic behavior, and accountability problems might
identify those situations in which shifting a covenant to a successor
would prevent inefficient relationships. Explicit use of an efficient alloca-
tion test might make the touch and concern element of land promise law
clearer, satisfying the frequently expressed need for a workable defini-
tion. Fewer cases revolving around the question of whether a covenant
runs would arise, because lawyers would be better able to predict the
outcomes of such disputes. For the same reason, parties would be less
likely to forgo the covenant approach in favor of alternatives if touch and
concern were more clearly defined. Moreover, conveyancers could use
covenants more securely if courts would heed their explanations of the
efficiencies associated with attaching a covenant, including their recita-
tions of any special local circumstances that make attachment efficient.
In sum, by clarifying the doctrine, the efficient allocation approach could
reduce the transaction costs, rent seeking, and negative incentive effects
now associated with touch and concern. 178
But such gains might carry an unexpected cost. By making effi-
ciency an explicit consideration, courts might in the end reach less effi-
cient results. The cases suggest that courts do a fine job of seeking
efficiency without labeling their search as such; they seem to find effi-
ciency without appearing to have sought it at all. Indeed, an explicit
statement of the efficient allocation test might limit courts' considera-
tions, causing subtle efficiencies to go unrecognized or ignored. 179 An
178. See Freedom of Contract, supra note 36, at 1361-64; text accompanying notes 55-66.
179. One earlier attempt to give the touch and concern element economic interpretation led to a
nonsensical rule. The Restatement of Property's rule that the burden of a covenant may not run with
land unless the benefit touches and concerns some other land seems to result from a combination of
two premises: first, that land resources are finite, and second, that the burden of a restrictive cove-
nant reduces the social utility of the affected land. See REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 537 com-
ment a (1944). In order not to reduce the value derived from that limited resource, land, we must
make sure that any loss of utility in one parcel is offset by a gain in another. Even if one ignores the
plausible possibility that losses in land utility might be made up by gains in the utilization of other
(nonland) resources, the Restatement position is misguided. The first premise noted above is plausi-
ble. Although more land might be created, it is certainly true that the supply of land is less price-
elastic than the supply of many other resources. But the second premise is wrong. A promisee
realizes a benefitfrom land if a promisor keeps a promise, whether or not the benefit relates to the
use of any other land. The promisor's enjoyment in using the land as limited by the covenant,
combined with the promisee's enjoyment of the land as a result of the promisor's performance of
their covenant is greater than their combined enjoyment of the same land in the absence of the
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enumeration of categories might lead courts to overlook unclassified inef-
ficiencies. Even a general test worded in terms of "efficiency" might nar-
row the efforts of lawyers unsophisticated in economic analysis, causing
them to argue false economies or ignore important efficiencies that they
cannot articulate in economic jargon. 180
Given courts' excellent record at seeking efficiency, changing to an
explicitly economic test could easily bring about less efficient outcomes.
In the end, one must weigh that possibility against the likely gains of
increased predictability.18 It might well be best for courts applying the
touch and concern requirement to continue doing what they are doing
and saying what they are saying.
According to the evidence supporting the efficient allocation hy-
pothesis, the touch and concern requirement does not determine the sur-
vival of covenants. Therefore, any analysis of the doctrines governing
land promises should at least consider framing the touch and concern
issue as a choice of which person (original covenantor or successor)
should be held liable to perform a covenant and which person should be
permitted to enforce the covenant. If that narrow perspective can ex-
plain judicial behavior, then the touch and concern requirement per-
forms a quite limited check on the parties' expressed intent. Thus
limited, judicial review of attempts to tie promises to interests in land
may be justified on utilitarian grounds. Because land traders are inexpe-
rienced and the assets involved are unique, efficiency concerns justify a
harder look at covenants intended to run with land than at ordinary con-
covenant. Just as the division of land geographically (into smaller parcels) or temporally (into a
term of years and a reversion) can result in greater total enjoyment than is possible with the interests
joined in one owner, division of the land with respect to use might also maximize its value. That a
covenant does not, in some people's view, rise to the dignity of an estate in land does not mean that
the interest created in the land should be ignored in calculations of the benefits derived from the
parcel. Because it is entirely possible for a single piece of land to generate more good if two people
divide the rights respecting its use, the idea that one lot should not be burdened unless a different lot
is benefited is defective.
180. As must be obvious, this Article does not take the view that the explanation of judicial
events in economic terms will itself have a detrimental impact on judicial decisionmaking, although
that is a possibility. But the question whether the judiciary should itself adopt the economic terms is
another issue entirely. On that issue, one might argue that we should not hesitate to urge judges to
adopt a more accurate test, just as we should not hesitate to urge mountaineers to use watches so
they can get to safety before nightfall. But there is cause to hesitate. If it appears that the climbers
do a tolerable job of reckoning time from the angle of the sun, a watch might reduce their safety.
First, they might not know how to read the watch. We might instruct them by teaching. But would
it not be the safer course to do the teaching before we pass out the watches? Second, watches might
fail in the mountains. Safety suggests that watches be tested under the intended conditions of use,
high altitude, and cold, before climbers come to depend on them. Unless both the watch and its
wearer will perform consistently, the new instrument should not replace the old.
181. Indeed, if the courts botch the economic analysis often enough, as is easily done, none of
the predictability gains will accrue.
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tracts. In applying the touch and concern requirement, the courts quite
effectively take that hard look.
Indeed, judges' intuited sense of efficiency may be so powerful that
they will continue to address the economic concerns now comprehended
by the touch and concern requirement whether or not that rubric re-
mains available. If so, eliminating the requirement as a matter of doc-
trine would prove ineffective, and possibly counterproductive. Without
the touch and concern test to comprehend efficiency factors, courts
might incorporate their concerns into other existing doctrine, or invent a
new element to replace touch and concern. Creating a new element to
take the place of touch and concern would confuse conveyancers at least
during its gestation, and might finally turn out to be even less
comprehensible.
In the end, forsaking the long-running requirement that promises
touch and concern could easily generate new uncertainties greater than
those eliminated by abandoning the requirement. Moreover, it remains
doubtful whether the negative incentive effects and other uncertainty
costs associated with the touch and concern requirement outweigh the
gains realized by increased judicial review of attempts to bind promises
to land. 182 Without evidence that the requirement substantially impedes
conveyancers, we should resist the temptation to displace this ancient
strand of servitude law.
182. Epstein relies on incentive effects and other costs of uncertainty in attacking the touch and
concern element. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
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